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About the Project 
The research project micle – “Migration, Climate and Environmental Changes in the Sahel” – 
investigates the social-ecological conditions of population movements in Mali and Senegal. The 
overall goal of the project is to contribute to a better understanding of the complex relationships 
between (climate-related) environmental changes and migration. 
Sahelian countries are expected to be amongst the regions most affected by impacts of climate 
change such as hotter and drier climates, oscillations in precipitation patterns and land degrada-
tion. The UNDP estimates that a considerable amount of drylands in sub-Saharan Africa could 
experience severe droughts. Countries like Senegal and Mali could lose up to 50 percent of their 
agricultural capacity. The Sahel and particularly West Africa has, on the other hand, a long his-
tory of population movements and represents a multitude of migration patterns and trajectories. 
For a few years now, internal and international migrations have increased in both countries. 
However, causes and motives for migration are manifold, and the relationship between ecosys-
tem changes and population mobility is complex. Therefore, an inter- and transdisciplinary re-
search approach is needed. 
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1  Introduction 
Diana Hummel, Martin Doevenspeck, Cyrus Samimi,  
Clemens Romankiewicz, Victoria van der Land, Martin Brandt 
 
For the last two decades, there has been an increasing interest in connections between the envi-
ronment and migration in the public and scientific debate. The discussion about the impacts of 
climate change has also fuelled the debate. Alarming predictions about millions of ‘environ-
mental migrants’ or even ‘climate refugees’ in the near future possibly raised some awareness 
about negative consequences of climate change but did little to promote an enlightened public 
debate. Yet, knowledge in this field still remains vague and fragmented: the significance of en-
vironment and climate within the broader social, political and economic context of migration is 
currently a subject of fierce scientific debate.  
African regions are expected to be the most affected by impacts of climate change such as hotter 
and drier climates, oscillations in precipitation patterns, droughts and land degradation. The 
UNDP (2009: 18) estimates that up to 90 million ha of drylands in sub-Saharan Africa could 
experience drought. Cline (2007) illustrates that Sahelian countries like Senegal and the Sudan 
could lose just over 50 percent of their agricultural capacity and Mali 30 to 40 percent (Leighton 
2011: 331). On the other hand, the Sahelian region and particularly West Africa has a long his-
tory of population movements and represents a multitude of migration patterns and trajectories. 
Mobility has been common in West Africa since pre-historic times and has included both cycli-
cal migrations linked to agricultural production styles, as well as more permanent movements 
resulting from the search for economic opportunities and changes of the environment (Castles 
2009, Sieveking/Fauser 2009, Schapendonk 2010, Cordell et al. 1996).  
The research project “Migration, Climate and Environmental Changes in the Sahel” – micle 
investigates the social-ecological conditions of population movements in Senegal and Mali. The 
overall goal of the project is to contribute to a better understanding of the complex relationships 
between (climate-related) environmental changes and migration, following an inter- and trans-
disciplinary approach. Based on an in-depth study at local level, the migration dynamics in two 
selected regions are analyzed as well as the specific ways in which people assess and evaluate 
environmental changes on the one hand and migration options and experiences, on the other. 
Two representative study regions were selected for empirical research in both countries: the re-
gion of Bandiagara in the southeast of Mopti in Mali and the region of Linguère in the north of 
Senegal. Based on first studies we identified both regions characterized by significant changes 
of the environment and high population mobility.   
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Figure 1: Study regions of the micle-project. Source: Wegener 2011 
Within the micle project empirical research is conducted among the residents of the selected 
regions as well as among migrants from these regions at other places within the two countries, 
in West Africa, and Europe. These findings are supplemented with regional demographic data, 
and  a  policy  analysis  of  the  institutional  conditions,  political  instruments  and  governance 
structures with respect to migration, development and land use. Within the analysis of environ-
mental changes and climate variability special attention is paid to land degradation. Focussing 
on a local and regional scale will help to analyse how climate variability and vegetation changes 
are linked. With these correlations in mind, degradation as well as improvement of vegetation 
can be assessed independently from climate variations in order to focus on land use practices 
and their impacts on environmental changes. Like this, we gain a deeper insight into the in-
fluences of climate change and land use on environmental change, as well as into possible adap-
tation strategies. The studies will not be based on purely natural science methods alone but will 
involve the perception and evaluation of environmental change by the local population. This not 
only  allows  us  a  better  understanding  of  ecosystem  changes,  but  also  to  link  the  natural-
scientific findings to the results of the socio-political analysis. 
On this empirical basis, we will be able to make more robust statements about the relevance of 
environmental changes for migration. The project also contributes to methodological advance-
ment. A methodology for integrating diverse kinds of research results is iteratively developed. 
That way, natural-scientific findings on environmental changes, in particular land degradation, 
are linked to social-scientific insights into migration. This is done by joint conceptual work, the 
formulation of hypothesis, and modelling. The practical objective of micle is to identify policy 
options and possibilities for decision-making in order to support locally adapted policies.  
This working paper provides a summarized state of the art of selected issues analyzed in the 
micle project. Chapter 2 gives an outline of the current scientific debate on climate change, en-
vironment and migration and highlights the most significant controversies, as well as overall 
conceptual and methodological issues. Chapter 3 addresses the climatic and environmental con-
ditions in the Sahel in general and Mali and Senegal in particular. It mainly discusses the issue 
of land degradation in the region and the role of agriculture in this context. The issue of migra- 
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tion is subject of chapter 4. Firstly, the changing patterns of migration into and from West Af-
rica are analyzed. Against this background, the subsequent sections address migration dynamics 
in Senegal and Mali, and in the study regions Linguère and Bandiagara. Chapter 5 examines the 
most important international, regional and national policies concerning migration in both coun-
tries. Chapter 6 concludes with an overview of the conceptual approach of the micle project.  
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2   Research on Climate, Environment and Migration  
Diana Hummel, Martin Doevenspeck 
 
2.1  Numbers and estimates 
Since the last two decades, there has been an increasing interest in linkages between the envi-
ronment and migration, both within the scientific community and among policy makers. Nu-
merous studies and reports assume that environmental change and climate change will in all 
likelihood be a major cause for increasing population movements in the future. Already in 1990 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicated “The gravest effects of cli-
mate change may be those on human migration as millions will be displaced” (IPCC 1990: 20). 
Just over 20 years ago, the executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) reported that “as many as 50 million people could become environmental refugees” if 
the world did not act and support sustainable development (Tolba 1989: 25). However, esti-
mates  of  the  current  and potential future  magnitude  of  environmentally  induced  population 
movements differ broadly and are highly controversial.  
Myers (1993, 2001) estimated the numbers of environmentally displaced persons by the year 
2010 at around 25–50 million people. These numbers are based on calculations of the number of 
inhabitants of a region that might become affected by some form of environmental degradation. 
Myers assumed that these people will become “environmental refugees” (cf. Kniveton et al. 
2008: 29). A number of recent reports highlighted the potential for additional mass migration as 
a result of climate change, drawing on figures put forward by Myers and Kent (1995) in the 
context of the “environmental refugee” debate. A report written for Greenpeace Germany sug-
gests that there will be 150 to 200 million “climate change refugees” in the coming 30 years 
(Jakobeit/Methmann 2007). The Stern Review on the economics of climate change mentions 
120–200 million people (Stern 2007: 77) while a report for Christian Aid (2007) goes much 
further suggesting more than 700 million people by 2050. Based on the estimates of Myers 
(2005) the International Organization for Migration (IOM) assumes a number of 200 million 
“environmental migrants” by 2050 (Brown 2008). This number is the most frequently cited 
figure in literature. Against the background of these highly divergent figures the 4
th Assessment 
Report of the IPCC regards the estimates of numbers of “environmental migrants” as “at best, 
guesswork”, because of a host of intervening factors that influence both climate change impacts 
and migration patterns, and suggests the need for extreme caution in dealing with numbers 
(Wilbanks et al. 2007: 365, see also Black et al. 2008: 5).  
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Estimates of the Environmentally Displaced Population due to  
Climate Change Impacts  
￿ People potentially at risk of being displaced because of desertification: 135 million 
(Almería Statement 1994) 
￿ Number of people who have fled because of floods, famine and environmental disasters: 
approximately 24 million (UNHCR 2002: 12) 
￿ People at risk of sea-level-rise by 2050: 162 million (Myers 2002) 
￿ People at risk of droughts and other climate change events by 2050: 50 million  
(Myers 2002) 
￿ People estimated to become permanently displaced “climate refugees” by 2050:    
150–200 millions (Stern 2007) 
￿ Environmentally displaced people by 2010: 50 million (UNFCCC 2007) 
￿ Refugees due to climate change by 2050: 250 millions (Christian Aid 2007) 
￿ People displaced by 2030: 78 million (Global Humanitarian Forum 2009) 
Estimates of environmentally displaced people (Adamo 2008: 6, Foresight 2011: 28).  
There are several reasons for these huge differences in numbers: First, there is no general agree-
ment about the causal linkages among environmental changes and migration. Secondly, the 
estimates refer to different notions and concepts of “environmental refugees”, “climate induced 
migration” etc. Thirdly, the estimates of the potential magnitude of climate-change related dis-
placements differ broadly depending on sources and methods. According to Adamo (2008) the 
numbers generally tend to reflect population at risk from certain environmental degradation. 
However, as Black (2001: 9) emphasized, “calculating the population ‘at risk’ from sea level 
rise is a long way from predicting mass flight of a ‘refugee’ nature” (Black 2001: 9). Moreover, 
being at risk does not necessarily mean that people do actually move (Piguet 2008: 4). The key 
issue as Adamo (2008: 6) points out is “A more precise measurement and eventually forecasting 
of environmentally induced displacements would require a better understanding of the mecha-
nisms  linking  environmental  stress  and  demographic  behaviour.  The  identification  of  these 
mechanisms entails considering different factors, levels of determination and temporal and spa-
tial scales”. Measurement problems include, among others: 
–  lack of a clear definition of environmentally induced displacements; 
–  the general scarcity of migration data, particularly longitudinal data and data from develop-
ing countries; 
–  the  use  of  different  information  sources  (broad-ranging  global  prognosis  on  population 
growth, climate change and resource constraints, or national or local studies of specific situa-
tions); 
–  the complexity of linking migration to environmental processes and events; 
–  lack of consideration of other adaptive practices than migration (Adamo 2008: 5).  
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2.2  Definitions and Terminological/Conceptual Difficulties  
The increasing political and scientific concerns about the consequences of climate change for 
population mobility have not resolved the debate on exactly what constitutes an environmentally 
induced move and how to explain it. “The current general agreement that environmental factors 
contribute to population mobility translates into only modest consensus about the mechanisms, 
character, extent of that contribution” (Adamo 2008: 2). In the literature, different concepts and 
terminologies are used: “environmental refugees”, “environmental migrants”, “environmentally 
induced migration”, “climate refugees” etc. All these terms are highly controversial.  
The idea of “environmental refugee” was introduced by several authors. Lester Brown of the 
World Watch Institute already used the term in the 1970s (Kniveton et al. 2008: 29)
1 and it was 
further popularized in 1985 by El-Hinnawi in a report for the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme (UNEP). This report defined environmental refugees as “those people who have been 
forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked en-
vironmental disruption (natural or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or 
seriously affected the quality of their life [sic]”. In this context‘environmental disruption’ is de-
fined as any physical, chemical, and/or biological changes in the ecosystem (or resource base) 
that render it, temporarily or permanently, unsuitable to support human life” (El-Hinnawi 1985: 
4). The debate on “environmental refugees” was strongly influenced by the neo-Malthusian as-
sumption that population growth would lead to migration and conflict caused by resource scar-
city. Albeit, this assumption was barely supported by empirical evidence, the term has been 
widely diffused in the political as well as in the academic debate since the 1980s. On the other 
hand, it has been widely challenged by a number of scholars (Castles 2002, Bates 2002, Black 
2001, Lonergan 1998, Kibreab 1997). In short, objections are derived from three perspectives: 
theoretical, legal, and political (Oliver-Smith 2009: 10f.):  
1.  Theoretical arguments: Many authors state that it is misleading to attribute a direct causality 
since migration is always a result of multiple factors. For example, Castles (2002: 5) rejects 
the term “environmental refugee” because of being “simplistic, one-sided and misleading. It 
implies a monocausality which very rarely exists in practice”. Instead, environmental factors 
should be seen as part of a “complex pattern of multicausality”, in which they are closely 
linked to economic, social and political factors (ibid.). There is a complex relationship be-
tween environmental change, perceptions of these change, and human agency, which also in-
cludes possible adaptation in a way that might reduce the need to migrate (Tacoli 2009: 107).  
2.  Legal arguments: Different authors (Laczko/Aghazarm 2009: 18, Brown 2008: 13f., Black 
2001) indicate that the term “environmental refugee” or “climate refugee” is a misnomer un-
der international law and risks undermining the precise legal definition of a refugee and the 
existing protection regime.
2 Furthermore, the term “refugee” is defined in relation to cross-
                                                       
1   Some use the term „ecological refugee“. In German, authors such as Wöhlke (1992), Bächler (1994) and Richter 
(1998) introduced the term “Umweltflüchtlinge”. In French, the term “réfugiés de l´environnement” has been 
used, for example, by Gonin and Lassailly-Jacob (2002).  
2   The United Nations’ 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees are clear that the term 
should be restricted to those fleeing persecution: “a refugee is a person who owint to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion,  
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border movement. Since the bulk of environmental migration tends to occur within countries 
rather than between countries Laczko/Aghazarm (2009: 18) suggest adding the term “inter-
nally displaced persons”.  
3.  Political arguments: Other authors formulate objections because of instances when the term 
“refugee” has nourished anti-immigration and racist perspectives, pointing to the fear that 
has recently entered the political discussion in Europe and North America . For example, Ki-
breab (1997: 21) is arguing that the term “environmental refugee” was “invented at least in 
part to depoliticise the causes of displacement, so enabling states to derogate their obligation 
to provide asylum”. More recently, Wisner (2009) and Hartmann (2009) argued that research 
on environment and migration runs the risk of energizing anti-immigration policies, and as-
sert that the term “environmental refugee” could naturalize and depoliticize the economic 
and political causes and mask the institutional responses to it. Such arguments can certainly 
be discussed however, the concerns express the difficulties of developing adequate political 
and practical responses to deal with environmentally induced population movements.  
Given the difficulty of having different definitions Renaud et al. (2007) proposed to distinguish 
between  environmental  refugees,  environmentally  motivated  migrants  and  environmentally 
forced migrants. They define “a forced environmental migrant as a person who ‘has to leave 
his/her place of normal residence because of an environmental stressor (…) as opposed to an 
environmentally motivated migrant who is a person who ‘may’ decide to move because of an 
environmental stressor” (Renaud et al. 2007: 11f.).  
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) aimed at offering an alternative for the use 
of the term ‘environmental refugees’ and proposed the comparatively broad working definition 
of “environmental migrants” who are described as “persons or groups of persons who, for com-
pelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their 
lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either 
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” (IOM 2007: 1).  
For a more precise definition of migration related to the impacts of climate change Kniveton et 
al. (2008: 16) refer to the working definition of the IOM cited above. The authors propose to 
consider “climate change migrants” as a sub-set of environmental migrants and suggest the fol-
lowing broadened concept of “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of 
sudden or progressive changes in the environment as a result of climate change that adversely 
affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do 
so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” 
(emphasis by the authors). Following Piguet (2008: 4) this definition is well suited to designate 
a category of migration in an unambiguous way vis-á-vis the 1951 Convention, “but it might 
give to the climate a nearly deterministic status of deus ex-machina which is not confirmed in 
empirical research on migration”.  
                                                       
is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country” (Resolution 429 of the United Nations General Assembly, 1951, http://www.cas/ 
com/discoveryguides/refugee/review2.php/)   
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Generally speaking, the deficiencies and caveats of the several concepts can be summarized by 
the following points (Doevenspeck 2011):  
￿ Analytical weakness: The terms “environmental refugee” or “environmental migrant” sug-
gest a unidirectional link between environmental changes and migration. The core of the 
problems is that most migration has manifold, interrelated and complex causes. It thus 
seems analytically impossible to identify a migration stream as principally environment-
ally-induced.  In  most  cases  only  through  simplifications  can  environmental  factors  be 
identified as root causes for population displacement.  
￿ Terminological  ambiguity:  despite  various  attempts (Myers/Kent  1995,  Bates  2002) the 
term itself remains poorly defined, thus making it extremely difficult to decide who could 
be classified as an environmental refugee. Attempts to overcome this deficit by using a less 
biased  terminology  such  as  environmental  migrants  or  distinguishing  between  environ-
mentally motivated migrants, environmentally forced migrants and environmental refugees 
may be useful for policy action. But given the seamless transitions between “motivated” and 
“forced”, this does not offer a convincing solution for conceptual and theoretical problems.  
￿ Political instrumentalization: Even if it is doubtful that the concept of environmental or cli-
mate refugees is the result of a coordinated strategy of political decision-makers in the in-
dustrialized world in order to depoliticize international migration it is astonishing that such 
an analytically weak concept is still so prominent on the agendas of organizations such as 
IOM, UNEP, IPCC and UNU which are very powerful in setting the international discourse.  
Meanwhile, there is wide agreement among scholars that environmentally induced population 
movements may be arranged in a broad spectre ranging from forced to compelled to voluntary, 
depending on the intensity of the hazard, the vulnerability of the exposed population, and the 
availability of assistance (Hugo 1996, Renaud et al. 2007, Bates 2002). “Population mobility is 
probably best viewed as being arranged along a continuum ranging from totally voluntary mi-
gration, in which the choice and will of the migrants is the overwhelmingly decisive element 
encouraging people to move, to totally forced migration, where the migrants are faced with 
death if they remain in their present place of residence. The extremes in fact rarely occur, and 
most mobility is located along the continuum. Environmentally induced migration is concerned 
with moves toward the forced end of this continuum” (Hugo 2008: 16).  
The majority of the environmentally induced population movements have been internal and 
short-term (Lazko/Aghazarm 2009: 23, Hugo 1996, Hugo 2008, Myers 2002). Some evidence 
shows that the spatial distribution of pre-existing migrant networks and other forms of social 
capital are relevant to estimate the probability of local or long-distance moves as well as the 
probability to return (Curran 2002, Adamo 2009: 14).  
To capture several possible combinations, particularly for policymaking and development plan-
ning, the IOM (2007) has suggested different scenarios (Adamo 2009: 14):  
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1. The propensity to migrate in 
relation to environmental 
change 
2. The impact of migration on 
the environment 
3. Interactions between migra-
tion, environmental change, 
human security and conflict
3  
A. Migration at less advanced 
stages of gradual environmental 
change 
E. Migration’s impact on the 
environment in areas of desti-
nation 
G. Human security challenges of 
environmental change and migra-
tion 
B. Migration at advanced stages of 
gradual environmental change 
F. Migration’s impact on the 
environment in areas of origin 
H. Conflict potential of environ-
mental change and migration 
C. Migration due to extreme envi-
ronmental events 
   
D. Migration due to large-scale 
development and land conserva-
tion  
   
Table 1: IOM’s Migration-Environment Scenarios. Source: Adamo 2009: 14  
In sum, migration can occur in response to sudden disasters and extreme environmental events, 
e.g. earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, drought (cf. Naik 2009) and gradual, slow-onset environ-
mental change (e.g. sea level rise, soil erosion, deforestation and desertification (cf. Leighton 
2009). While in the case of sudden natural disasters the role of geophysical factors is immedi-
ately evident, this role is less clear in the case of slow-onset disruption (Adamo/de Sherbinin 
2008: 26). Furthermore, population movements can be organized according to the following 
spectrum: voluntary – forced; temporary – permanent; short-term – long-term; short distance – 
long distance; internal – international; vulnerability – resilience (Laczko/Aghazarm 2009: 23, 
Adamo/de Sherbinin 2008: 26).  
Terms such as “environmental change”, “environmental stress” or “environmental degradation” 
encompass a diversity of phenomena which need further specification. In the literature, different 
categories of environmental changes are listed, which might cause population displacements 
(McLeman/Hunter 2010, Lonergan 1998, Naik 2009, Leighton 2009, Piguet et al. 2011) and 
which can be categorized as follows: 1) natural disasters characterized by rapid onset (e.g. earth-
quakes, volcanoes, and floods); 2) cumulative changes or slow-onset changes (deforestation, 
land degradation, desertification); 3) accidental disruptions or industrial accidents (e.g. chemical 
manufacture  and  transport  or  nuclear  reactor  accidents);  4)  development  projects  involving 
forced settlements (e.g. dams, large irrigation projects) and 5) conflict and warfare. These dif-
ferent categories must be treated separately, and cannot be considered collectively as “environ-
mental change”, since they have quite different impacts on population movements. While in the 
case of sudden natural disasters the role of geophysical factors is often regarded as immediately 
evident, this role seems to be lass clear in the case of slow-onset disruption (Adamo/de Sher-
binin 2008).  
                                                       
3   This  third  category  „Interactions  between  migration,  environmental  change,  human  security  and  conflict“  is 
mentioned here only for the sake of completeness. This issue will not be addressed in the micle project. More-
over, the concept of “human security” remains vague, and the linkages among environmental changes, migration 
and conflict is scientifically a controversial issue.   
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Piguet et al. (2011: 6ff.; see also Martin 2009: 356) predict three main environmental factors 
that might significantly increase due to climate change, and which are held to have impacts on 
migration: sea level rise, increase in strength and frequency of natural disasters (hurricanes, 
cyclones, heavy rains and floods), droughts and desertification. .  
For  the  micle  project,  particularly  the  two  last  mentioned  (climate-induced)  environmental 
changes are of relevance: a) Possible increase of heavy rains and floods as rapid-onset phenom-
ena with an impact on population movements and b) drought and land degradation – which is the 
major focus of the micle project. Generally, these environmental processes encompass very dif-
ferent phenomena that usually generate impacts of a far less sudden nature such as increasing 
temperatures and changing rainfall patterns. They affect agricultural production and diminish 
people’s livelihoods and access to clean drinking water, thus potentially leading “to more pro-
gressive patterns of mobility” (Piguet et al. 2011: 8). However, the research manifests very little 
consensus about the impacts of land degradation on migration, and the results are highly varied 
– depending on the regions and scales studied, and on the diversity of data sets used (ibid.). 
Some studies confirm a direct link between drought and emigration, others come to a contradic-
tory result, namely that drought has only minimal impacts on migration, while a third group 
shows contrasting patterns according to the type of migration concerned – long-term vs. short-
term and long-distance vs. short-distance migration (ibid., see also Leighton 2011, Foresight: 
Migration and Global Environmental Change 2011).  
Generally, there is a broad consensus in the scientific literature that environmental change is one 
of a multiplicity of contributing factors to environmentally-induced migration. Migration is a 
complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by one single reason alone (Piguet et al. 2011, 
Laczko/Aghazarm 2009, Warner et al. 2009, Martin 2009, Kniveton et al. 2009, Hugo 2008, 
Castles 2002, Black 2001, Wood 2001). “There is agreement today that natural factors are not 
the sole cause of migration in themselves and that the economic, social and political situation of 
the zone under threat can, depending on the case, increase or decrease the flow of migrants” (Pi-
guet 2008: 3). Similarly, climate change, on its own, does not directly cause people to move, but 
it produces environmental effects and exacerbates current vulnerabilities that make it difficult 
for people to survive where they are. Environmental changes such as land degradation can con-
tribute to migration just as the economic, demographic, political and social situation can do. The 
challenge therefore is to relate the multiple factors shaping migration streams in the context of 
environmental/climate change in order to understand their internal logics and interactions. Fur-
thermore,  the formulation of  appropriate  analyses requires a theoretical  contextualisation  of 
these interactions, which enables the researcher to make reliable assumptions about potential 
linkages  between  the  environment  and  human  mobility.  Therefore,  a  research  approach  is 
needed which at least combines natural-scientific and social-scientific expertise. 
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2.3  Environment, Climate and Population Movement: the Weak Link  
  to Migration Theory 
As mentioned in the previous section, there is a broad consensus among scholars involved in 
research on the environment-migration nexus that migration is a complex phenomenon, which 
cannot be addressed with a mono-causal explanatory approach. However, what at first glance 
appears to be a refreshingly differentiated view turns into a truism if one takes a quick look at 
contemporary migration research and migration theory (e.g. de Haas 2008). Here, it is anything 
but a new insight that migration cannot be explained in a deterministic linear way and that its 
causes,  features  and  patterns  are  complex,  dynamic  and  highly  context-dependent.  What  is 
more, is that many empirical case studies on environmentally induced migration contradict the 
more general claims of policy papers of the IOM or publications of the UNU staff (see Warner 
et al. 2010, Warner 2011) by reproducing simplistic causal relationships. In his literature review 
Jónsson (2010) shows that more recent studies on migration and environment in the West Afri-
can Sahel are still deeply entrenched in static push-pull frameworks and neglect the intertwining 
of environmental with the various other dimensions of human migration. To cite only one of the 
case studies realized within the project Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios 
(EACH-FOR): “Generally, when people migrate, they do not have anything and therefore, they 
do not have any other choice than to move. Therefore, it is forced migration for environmental 
reasons” (Afifi 2009: 23). This discrepancy can be seen as a tendency of the debate on environ-
ment and migration to isolate itself from the empirical and theoretical insights of mainstream 
migration research (Verne/Doevenspeck forthcoming). This in turn, leads to undertheorized case 
studies, which ultimately provokes widespread doubts about the credibility of a whole branch of 
research. To sum it up, population movements to whatever extent shaped by environmental 
factors must be reconnected to migration theory instead of approaching them as an isolated phe-
nomena. Hence, in what follows we will roughly outline the three most influential theoretical 
approaches to migration, position them briefly within mainstream social theory and try to for-
mulate a preliminary synthesis.  
1.  The understanding of migration streams as environmentally determined implies a theoretical 
positioning  within  the  neo-classical  equilibrium  perspective  which  itself  can  be  situated 
within the functionalist paradigm of social theory. It conceptualises migration, in analogy to 
approaches that focus on labour markets and income differentials of individuals (Todaro 
1980, Borjas 1989), as a process of equalisation between regions of deteriorating environ-
mental conditions and areas where the state of the environment is better. Although these 
push-pull assumptions point at some causation factors for and consequences of unidirectional 
migration, they do not help to understand why migration continues without spatial differ-
ences in wages and income or, to remain in the context, why environmental degradation in a 
certain region never leads to emigration of all inhabitants. The limitations of push-pull ex-
planations become even more apparent when we consider the relativity and weak conceptu-
alisation of alleged ‘root causes’ of migration in sub-Saharan Africa such as ‘population 
pressure’ and ‘environmental degradation’. Moreover „many migrants tend to move from ar-
eas with relatively low population densities and relatively little environmental degradation to 
environmentally degraded areas with high population densities. People tend to be increas- 
  16 
ingly concentrated in crowded places – cities, towns, and prosperous agricultural areas – 
that, however, in spite of their crowdedness generally offer better social and economic op-
portunities in terms of individual freedom, safety, education, health care, paid labour, entre-
preneurial activities and amusement” (de Haas 2008: 10).  
2.  As a criticism against the rigidity and the individualistic perspective of neo-classical and 
structuralist approaches, the new economics of labour migration theory conceptualizes mi-
gration as a household strategy of minimizing and spreading risk (Stark 1991, Massey et al. 
1993). In line with prevailing theories in the social sciences during the 1980s and early 
1990s that focussed on structure-agency-interactions, this approach considers the household 
as the key decision-making unit in migration processes and calls for a systematic embedding 
of migration decisions in the respective social and political context. The new economics of 
labour migration theory shares the emphasis on human agency with the sustainable liveli-
hood approach that considers not only the households’ income but also a range of different 
social, economic, political and natural resources (assets) to analyse how the poor in the 
global south actively cope with their harsh living conditions (see Chambers/Conway 1992). 
Accordingly migration can be seen as one of various strategies to strengthen and sustainably 
improve rural livelihoods (Findley 1997, de Haan et al. 2002).  
3.  A third theoretical perspective that focuses less on proper migration causes than on the inter-
play between migration and processes of formation and maintenance of social structures and 
thus on the perpetuation of human mobility is the social network approach. Already Hugo 
(1981: 208–209) stated that a “key role of these networks in the decision-making process is 
that of taking much of the uncertainty out of moving by providing assurances of assistance in 
seeking employment and housing as well as emotional support at the destination. … Move-
ment generally occurs through well-defined contact networks. … They may be kinship or 
friendship channels that have been shown to be particularly important in Third World coun-
tries”. In this perspective migration is understood as a social product and not as a response to 
economic, political or environmental stimuli (Portes/Sensenbrenner 1993). Even if scholars 
such as Portes (1995) pointed at the hidden costs of social networks and the associated con-
straints  for  migration,  social  capital  is  mostly  considered  as  promoting  migration 
(Massey/Espinosa 1997, Muanamoha et al. 2010). It is thanks to the social networks ap-
proach that migration is now widely considered as a selective process that develops very dif-
ferent patterns at the same time and in the same place which points at the importance to ana-
lyse the internal dynamic of multidirectional migration and the formation of delocalised so-
cial phenomena. 
However, considering that social network approaches fail to include external and structural fac-
tors that shape migration and the role of negative social capital to weaken ties within networks, 
it becomes obvious that with one single theoretical approach complex migration processes can-
not be entirely understood. There is a good reason for the multitude of theoretical approaches to 
migration given the multitude of (political, economic, ecological and social) reasons for and the 
various forms and courses of migration. Hence, the theoretical pluralism must be exploited to 
formulate appropriate syntheses for empirical findings on migration that are neither under- nor 
over-socialised and meet the requirements, which the cumulative causes for migration, its ten- 
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dency of self-perpetuation and its inter-temporal dimensions represent. With regard to the po-
tential linkages between migration and the environment the following theoretically based hy-
pothesis can be summarized: Environmental degradation may be one part of the structural con-
ditions within the contexts of the country of origin. These structural conditions shape migration 
patterns that can partly be explained with classical theoretical approaches. At the same time 
people perceive and deal with these conditions in different ways, which is why migration be-
comes a selective process, influenced by factors on different levels. These factors interact, they 
may accumulate, decrease or increase in importance as time goes by and maybe even be over-
laid by completely new ones. Once the process of migration has started, mechanisms of social 
structuring bring about self-strengthening of migration, whereas the accumulation of driving 
forces and their temporal and spatial variations contribute to its perpetuation. Factors shaping 
migration may change during time and may be different for each single migration during a life 
course. Migration itself causes and enforces social and economic change and brings about new 
migration as a consequence. Thus a unidirectional perspective should be abandoned in favour of 
an analysis of multidirectional one. 
Although this synthesis seems to be a careful and convenient working hypothesis it must not be 
overlooked that even this attempt still contains a certain sedentary bias since the inherent concep-
tualization of mobility itself ultimately tends to frame migration as a problem, “a response to 
crisis rather than a ‘normal’ part of people’s lives” (Bakewell 2008: 1345). Especially research 
on migration in Africa seems to reproduce a normative charging and a politicisation of human 
mobility (Castles 2009) and while mobility in the ‘developed world’ is something desirable if not 
indispensable, it is mostly seen as something that diverges from a proclaimed sedentarist norm 
for the ‘developing countries’. As Castles (2009) has pointed out, it is especially policy-driven 
migration research that is in danger of solidifying an understanding of migration as a “coping 
mechanism of last resort” (Adepojou 2006: 35). Such an understanding calls for a removal of the 
‘root causes’ for these situations of hardship and for stabilizing the ‘affected’ people in their con-
texts of origin. “In the long run, however, the aim must be to create sustained development and 
opportunities for ‹decent work›, to motivate people to remain in their home countries and benefit 
from local alternatives to migration” (ibid.). Here, the risk is that such an understanding contrib-
utes to the already mentioned isolation of migrations studies from broader social research. The 
so-called mobility paradigm that conceptualizes movement “as constitutive for economic, social 
and political relations” (Urry 2007: 43) acknowledges mobility as an integral part of human life 
and not as a problem per se, regardless of the place where this life is lived. This does not mean 
to ignore or to negate that people in Africa do have to tackle serious problems but it is reminder 
to not conceptualize mobility differently ‘here’ and ‘there’ and to accept that migration must not 
always and necessarily be a coping strategy. It should help to avoid the nonreflective perpetua-
tion of the metaphor of migration pressure and other “myths of migration” (Skeldon 1997: 7). 
Since natural and social processes are always intertwined there is no need for a peculiar theory 
for migration in the context of environmental or climate change. However, this short conceptual 
outline should have made clear, that the debate on the environment and migration must be re-
connected to migration theory in order to avoid simplistic frameworks and flawed concepts and 
to address the question empirically in a methodological sound way.   
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2.4  Methodological Aspects  
With the exception of flight as direct response to extreme events such as natural disasters or 
industrial accidents it is not only a conceptual but also a methodological challenge to make reli-
able assertions about the linkages between environmental change and migration. However, there 
is vast spectrum of methodological approaches to unbundle environmental issues from the mul-
titude of other factors that shape migration decisions. They can roughly be differentiated in 
quantitative, qualitative and model-based ones. This section gives a brief overview on the most 
frequent approaches within the variety of methods and their respective strengths and weaknesses 
as well as about some more general methodological problems linked to some conceptual flaws.  
A common approach is to collect environmental data, data on the social and economic context 
and on past or current (panel data) migrations through standardised questionnaires in more or 
less large surveys (Findley 1994, Henry et al. 2004, Massey at al. 2007, Shresta/Bhandari 2007). 
Though these approaches succeed to some extent by revealing case-specific correlations or non-
correlations between environmental factors and population movement, the main weakness is 
“that environmental change is only very incompletely captured” (Piguet 2010: 519). Piguet re-
sumes that none of the studies based on sample surveys he reviewed “draws on detailed envi-
ronmental evolutions captured along the whole period under review, and it thus remains diffi-
cult to disentangle environmental variables from other contextual effects” (ibid).  
Studies that apply ecological interference look at potential correlations between environmental 
demographic features of a certain region. The hypothesis is that environmental degradation 
should for example be reflected in a negative migration balance in this region. Multivariate sta-
tistics are used to disentangle the environmental factor from others and a couple of studies re-
veal correlations thatvary greatly with regard to their significance (Henry et al. 2003, Reuveny/ 
Moore 2009, van der Geest et al. 2010). Here, the main criticism is that the results do not allow 
reconstructing individual decision-making in migration processes from spatial and demographic 
aggregates. “In other words, nothing guarantees that the very people who emigrated and con-
tributed to a negative migration balance in an area under environmental stress, for example, are 
the same individuals who experienced that environmental stress and took a decision to migrate 
accordingly” (Piguet 2010: 518).  
Ethnographic  approaches  that  result  in  thick  descriptions  through  observation  and  in-depth, 
often biographical interviews with migrants are also frequently applied and can often avoid the 
methodological problems of the quantitative paradigm (see Meze-Hausken 2000, McLeman/ 
Smit 2006, Mortreux/Barnett 2009). Though these place-sensitive studies are usually more sus-
ceptible to the social constructedness of alleged ‘facts’ such as droughts and land degradation 
and manage to put meaning to the focus by considering perceptions and experiences of people, 
the problem remains in the limited comparability of a multitude of qualitative studies and hence 
the difficulties to aggregate them into a more general picture. 
Given the pros and cons of the methods briefly presented so far, a multilevel approach (see Zol-
nik 2009) seems to be the most promising, although it is probably the most costly and time-
intensive way to obtain valuable results. Such an approach has to consider perceptions, experi-
ences and the agency of individuals, as well as survey data on the household level, aggregated  
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demographic and ecological data by combining ethnographic-qualitative and if possible also 
mobile data gathering (Sheller/Urry 2006), multivariate statistics and remote sensing data on a 
longer time interval. There are already some examples, which, do, however, not entirely cover 
the data sets suggested above, but at least constitute a reliable and inspiring basis for future re-
search (eg. Ezra/Kiros 2001, Carr 2005, Gray 2009).  
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3  Environment and Migration in the Sahel 
Cyrus Samimi, Martin Brandt 
 
3.1  Climate 
The climate in West Africa hence Senegal and Mali is characterized by the seasonal fluctuation 
of the West African monsoon. In general, the rainfall decreases from south to north, with more 
than 3000 mm along the coast of Liberia, Sierra Leon and Guinea, dropping below 50 mm in 
northern Mauretania and northern Mali (fig. 2). Corresponding to the amount of rainfall the 
variability of precipitation increases from south to north. 
 
Figure 2: Mean annual rainfall in West Africa, 1998–2008 (data after Adler et al. 2003) 
The precipitation is related to the seasonal movement of the Intertropical Convergence Zone 
(ITCZ). It moves northward during boreal summer reaching at most 20°N, in winter the ITCZ is 
placed along the Gulf of Guinea coast. In West Africa the ITCZ marks the convergence zone of 
moist monsoonal air masses originating from the St. Helena anticyclone system and dry north-
eastern trade winds originating from the North African subtropical high, alternatively known as 
the Intertropical Discontinuity (ITD). The northward movement of the monsoon trough is often 
very variable, causing monsoon breaks with dry conditions. Additionally, it fluctuates diurnally 
by about 200 km. During northern summer the surface airflow is capped by two easterly jets, 
the African Easterly Jet (AEJ) and the Tropical Easterly Jet (TEJ). The rainfall patterns in West 
Africa are determined by the position of the monsoon trough, the strengths and latitudinal posi-
tions of the easterly jets and the development of African easterly waves (AEW) along the AEJ 
(e.g. Nicholson 2008, 2009). The region can be divided into three rainfall zones (D, C, and B) 
and a zone north of the monsoon trough (Zone A), related to the movement of the trough. Dur-
ing northern summer the coastal belt (Zone D) receives light rain. In the southern part of Zone C  
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rainfall is continues without storms. The north of Zone C, is mainly characterized by distur-
bance lines with stormy rain induced by the dynamics of the AEJ. In Zone B the depth of the 
monsoon air decreases rapidly and rain is produced only by isolated storms and thunderstorms. 
Areas north of the monsoon trough are almost totally dry (Zone A). In summary, the complex 
dynamic interactions between the surface airflows and the easterly jets control the rainfall pat-
terns in West Africa (e.g. Hastenrath 1988, Leroux 2001). 
These main processes of the West African monsoon are well understood, but causes for varia-
tions in the fluctuations of the monsoon trough, the exact role and dynamics of the AEJ and the 
related squall lines are still not entirely clear (e.g. Camberlin et al. 2001, Fall et al. 2006, Hulme 
et al. 2001, Janicot et al. 2001, Jenkins et al. 2002, Moron et al. 2008, Nicholson 2008, Paeth/ 
Thamm 2007).  
A clear influence on the rainfall distribution in West Africa is related to the sea surface tempera-
tures (SST) in the Atlantic and the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). In this context El Niño 
events significantly correlate with droughts in the Sahel (Camberlin et al. 2001, Ward 1998). 
Hirst/Hastenrath (1983) among others showed that warmer SSTs in the South Atlantic result in 
higher rainfall in the Gulf of Guinea and its coast but lower precipitation in the Sahel from July 
until September but there is no clear link between ENSO events and Sahel rainfall especially at a 
low-frequency scale but a clear response to SST fluctuations in the Atlantic (Janicot et al. 2001). 
Janicot et al. (2001) come to the conclusion that a complex influence of SSTs is responsible for 
rainfall patterns and trends in the Sahel at different frequency scales, including ENSO-SSTs, 
SSTs in the Mediterranean Sea (Rowell 2003) and the Indian Ocean (Bader/Latif 2003). Addi-
tionally, land-surface-moisture feedbacks play an important role (Paeth/Thamm 2007), as well as 
the strength and position of the Sahara low (Biasutti et al. 2009). 
The complexity of the climatic situation in Western Africa is also the reason why mid-time fluc-
tuations of rainfall are not yet fully understood. In the 60s, 70s and 80s of the 20
th century the 
rainfall in the Sahel of Western Africa was characterized by an amount below average and long 
lasting droughts. Since the 90s the precipitations are slowly increasing but have not yet reached 
the levels of mid last century (Fink et al. 2010, Giannini et al. 2008, Lebel/Ali 2009, Nicholson 
2008). But the precipitation patterns in the Sahel are characterized by a high spatio-temporal 
variability and so droughts and floods occur frequently on interannual and decadal scales (e.g. 
Paeth 2004, Paeth et al. 2011, Tarhule 2005). After the late 1980s variability has become even 
more frequent and extreme (Dai et al. 2004, Paeth et al. 2011) and could get even more so in the 
future (e.g. Christensen et al. 2007: 871). It is also discussed that rainfall patterns might increase 
along the Guinean coast with a decrease in the Sahel (Camberlin et al. 2001, Hulme et al. 2001, 
Milly et al. 2002, Paeth 2004, Paeth/Hense 2004, Paeth et al. 2009, Vigaud et al. 2009). How-
ever, it must be stressed that according to the 21 models used in the IPCC 4th Assessment Re-
port, the development of rainfall in West Africa is fairly uncertain at present (Christensen et al. 
2007, Joly et al. 2007). 
In contrast to the changes in rainfall it is proved that the temperature in West Africa has dra-
matically increased during the last decades (fig. 3) and scenarios predict a further increase  
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(Christensen et al. 2007). So higher precipitation might be compensated by higher evapotranspi-
ration. 
 
Figure 3: Annual mean of daily mean temperatures in Western Africa  
(the region is given by fig. 2) (data after Mitchell/Jones 2005) 
 
3.2  Environment 
The vegetation in the Sahel is mainly controlled by precipitation (Hickler et al. 2005), yet it 
remains unclear how exactly the declining rainfall and especially the severe droughts in the 70s 
and 80s have affected vegetation types and patterns during the last 30 years. Climate change and 
variability  are  regular  features  of  the  Sahel.  Hence,  the  native  plant  communities  are  well 
adapted to a certain range of climatic variations and it is hard to separate climatic factors which 
contribute to a changing environment from other factors. However, it is certain that human ac-
tivities have a serious impact on the environment. First evidence of human existence in the Sa-
hel dates from 600,000 B.P. Since that time, hunting, bush fires, agriculture, herding, charcoal 
production, exploitation of forest products and other activities may have modified the ecosys-
tem, leading to a gradual reduction of biodiversity (National Research Council 1984). This slow 
and gradual impact has changed dramatically during the last 50 years. Combined with a chang-
ing climate (droughts, increasing variability, decreasing rainfalls, higher temperatures, more 
intensive rainfalls, floods, shorter rainy season), rapid population growth, economic develop-
ment, urbanization and intensification of agriculture have serious implications for the people 
and the environment in the Sahel as summarized by Hammer (2005): 
–  The rapid growth of urban areas affects many fertile regions like river valleys and basins, 
–  due to a decrease in woody vegetation there is a decline in biodiversity, evapotranspiration, 
soil moisture, soil fertility and natural food supply for humans and animals, 
–  the wildlife declines rapidly,   
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–  decreasing rainfall, droughts and floods change the regeneration rate of the vegetation and of 
the ground water with severe implications for people, flora and fauna, 
–  urbanization creates new environmental problems, like air pollution, the need for waste man-
agement and soil- and water pollution. These problems also occur in rural areas, where waste 
is tilled into the soil, 
–  intensification of agriculture and its expansion into new regions reduce the natural vegetation 
and may lead to land degradation, 
–  animal husbandry causes pressure on vegetation and soil also leading to land degradation, 
–  regular bush fires replace natural trees and shrubs with less readily disseminated trees and 
shrubs or permanent grassland. Those fires reduce and simplify the vegetation and deplete 
the soil through losses of nitrogen (National Research Council 1984).  
Recent pilot studies conducted by the GLCN in Senegal during a climatically more or less stable 
period (1990–2005) using remote sensing and field assessment show a dramatic increase in 
agricultural areas and a small increase in tree plantations, closed trees and urban areas, while all 
other naturally vegetated areas (especially grassland and open shrubland, but also open tree and 
closed shrubland) significantly decreased between 1990 and 2005 (fig. 4, GLCN 2010). 
 
Figure 4: Senegal land cover change between 1990 and 2005 (GLCN 2010) 
Long term studies indicate an overall decrease in natural vegetation and an increase in agricul-
tural areas (Tappan et al. 2000, Tappan et al. 2004). For example savannahs in the Senegal de-
creased from 74% to 70% while croplands increased from 17% to 21% between 1965 and 2000, 
resulting in an overall decrease of the biodiversity. However, the studies state that in 2000 
Senegal's savannahs, woodlands and forests still cover two-thirds of the country. 
Unfortunately, detailed and reliable data at a national scale is only available for Senegal, but it is 
likely, that other Sahel countries show a similar pattern. For example Ruelland et al. (2010)  
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studied three experimental areas in Mali over 40 years and found a steady increase in croplands 
as well as a reduction of woodlands. Brink/Eva (2009) confirm this trend for the whole Sahel. 
They identified an agricultural expansion of +14.2% at the expense of forest (-1.5%) and natural 
non-forest vegetation (-29.2%). The West African Land Use and Land Cover Trends Project by 
the USGS and AGRHYMET mapped land cover and land use changes between 1975 and 2000 
in  12  West  African  countries  (Tappan  2010).  The  results  reflect  the  dramatic  population’s 
growth showing striking increases in agricultural and urban lands (table 2). 
  Agriculture  Others 
Benin  +77.0%  -27.1% dense forest 
Burkina Faso  +50.2%   -13.6% savannahs 
Ghana  +96.5%  -17.9% dense forest 
Guinea  +2.6%   
Togo  +80.0%   
Table 2: Environmental change in West African countries (after Tappan 2010) 
 
3.3  Land Degradation 
The West African Sahel is an ecologically highly vulnerable region because of its high climatic 
variability and fragile soils. That is why land degradation in the Sahel region has been a fre-
quently debated topic in scientific circles over the last three to four decades. The degree and 
severity of land degradation are still unclearas they are caused by uncertain definitions and 
knowledge, which are summarized by Rasmussen (1999): 
–  The definitions are vague and often only refer to certain scientific disciplines. Additionally, 
ifferences in perception and interests influence the terminology. 
–  There is a lack of hard data and studies that really prove degradation is a problematic basis 
for environmental policies. 
–  Spatial variability is often neglected. In the Sahel, differences in soil properties and rainfall 
show local and regional patterns, but the data used are often either micro-scale or global. 
–  The understanding of environmental processes over a longer period of time is deficient. Due 
to the lack of historical environmental data, false conclusions may be drawn, especially in 
highly diverse regions like the Sahel. 
There are many definitions of land degradation, but one of the most accepted is that of Wil-
liams/Balling (1995, cited in Rasmussen 1999: 152): “Reduction of biological productivity of 
dryland ecosystems, including rangeland pastures and rainfed and irrigated croplands, as a result 
of an acceleration of certain natural processes.” This may include a variety of processes such as 
loss of biodiversity, soil erosion by wind and water, depletion of soil nutrients, changes in the 
physical structure of the soil, salinization and others (Rasmussen 1999). All these processes 
interact and may be driven by human and/or climatic factors, which may again be enhanced by 
the effects of degradation. Figure 5 tries to illustrate these interactions.  
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Figure 5: Interaction among climate and human activities causing land degradation (after 
Hammer 2005, Ustin et al. 2009) 
However, in reality land degradation can be much more complex. Hammer (2005) classifies 
land degradation in the Sahel using the following ecological factors: 
–  temporal and spatial rainfall variability, 
–  dropping ground water level, 
–  highly vulnerable soils, 
–  infertile soils, 
–  high evapotranspiration, 
–  sparse vegetation cover, 
–  declining soil fertility and production of biomass,  
–  strong winds and dust storms, 
–  intensive rainfall. 
Internal factors are: 
–  abandonment of traditional land use systems, 
–  stagnancy of rural production- and resource management systems, 
–  pressure on resources through livestock, 
–  land and soil scarcity, 
–  wood as a main source of energy, 
–  loss of innovative young people due to migration, 
–  inadequate irrigation,  
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–  consumer orientated agricultural policy (not producer oriented), 
–  prevention of a change due to the political leaders’ attitudes, 
–  population growth, 
–  uncertainty in land use rights. 
External factors are: 
–  colonial history and policy, 
–  orientation towards the global market and price fluctuations, 
–  terms and conditions of the global market, 
–  national debt, 
–  export production, 
–  an increasing technological gap between Africa and the North. 
All these factors create processes, which interact and lead to a cycle enhancing land degradation, 
but the actual degree of land degradation in the Sahel remains unclear. There seem to be two 
parties with a differing judgment on land degradation. On one hand organisations like the UN 
and the FAO publish reports about widespread degradation in the Sahel. According to the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the combined effects of population growth, deforesta-
tion, intensive cropping, overgrazing, reduced rainfall and the lack of environmental policies 
have transformed a large proportion of the Sahel in barren land during the last 50 years (Kandji et 
al. 2006). In numbers, the UNEP states that 500 million hectares of African land are degraded, 
including 65% of agricultural land and 30% of the Sahel (Niemeijer/Mazzucato 2002). On the 
other hand there is a scientific community who tries to support this with hard data, but mostly 
fails and sometimes even comes to opposite conclusions (e.g. Mortimore 1998, Tiffen/Mortimore 
2002, Warren 2002). Niemeijer/Mazzucato (2002) for example found a rising agricultural pro-
ductivity in Burkina Faso, one of the officially most degraded countries in Africa.  
The reliability of the UNEP estimates is hard to prove. Most reports still rely on a 20 year old 
project called “Global Assessment of Human induced Soil Degradation” (GLASOD) from 1991 
(Oldeman et al. 1991). This project produced maps and reports based on regional expert judge-
ments, but the data have hardly been tested for consistency and so remain subjective. The type, 
rate, and extend of soil degradation were mapped for the whole globe and most of the Sahel 
countries separately. This approach has been misused and was criticised by many scholars (e.g. 
Nachtergaele et al. 2010, Niemeijer/Mazzucato 2002) and should therefore not be used at a re-
gional or national scale. But there are still a few alternatives available, and even recent studies 
rely on figures produced by GLASOD, indicating that 320,106 ha of the Western Sahel are af-
fected by soil degradation (Hammer 2005, Sissoko et al. 2010). Figure 6 shows that the GLA-
SOD approach suggests a degradation in the Western Sahel ranging from light to very severe.  
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Figure 6: GLASOD human induced soil degradation for the Western Sahel (after Oldeman et al. 
1991) 
Due to the criticism of GLASOD, a more recent approach called GLADA (Global Assessment 
of Land Degradation and Improvement) within the FAO program Land Degradation Assessment 
in Drylands (LADA) maps land degradation and improvement by using remote sensing tech-
niques (Bai/Dent 2007). They try to identify changes in net primary productivity using a dataset 
called GIMMS. This dataset contains global vegetation data with a spatial resolution of 8 km 
and a temporal resolution of 15 days is available since 1982 (Tucker et al. 2005). However, 
remote sensing can only provide indicators; a negative or positive trend does not necessarily 
mean degradation or improvement as greenness depends on many factors. 
So far, remote sensing studies in the Sahel do not reveal any kind of broad degradation. The 
GIMMS dataset was used in several studies, and NDVI analyses revealed a considerable green-
ing in most parts of the Sahel since 1982 (Anyamba/Tucker 2005, Eklundh/Sjöström 2005, 
Heumann et al. 2007, Olsson et al. 2005). Correcting the remotely sensed NDVI by the effects 
of rainfall to identify areas which do not respond to increasing rainfall also confirm the greening 
trend (fig. 7, Bai/Dent 2007, Herrmann et al. 2005). This greening might be a sign of recovery 
from the severe droughts in the 70s and the beginning 80s. The situation before the drought is 
unclear because of lacking data. It is also not yet known which vegetation type is causing the 
greening of the Sahel, but it can often be observed that diverse vegetation is replaced by vegeta-
tion of poor quality, a process hardly distinguishable by remote sensing. Additionally, it is ques-
tionable if the GIMMS dataset is reliable enough and if a resolution of 8 km and a time-scale of 
about 25 years are adequate, but these studies contradict the theory of a widespread and irre-
versible degradation. There is also no indication for the existence of millions of hectares of bar-
ren land and a large scale reduction of biological productivity, like reported by UNEP (Kandji et 
al. 2006). 
The use of the Rain Use Efficiency (RUE), which uses the net primary production (NPP) and 
annual rainfall, neither showed showed severe degradation (Bai/Dent 2007, Prince et al. 1998). 
If  degradation  was  detected  by  the  RUE  (Hein/Ridder  2006),  the  used  methodology  was 
strongly disputed (Prince et al. 2007).  
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Figure 7: Greening of the Sahel between 1982 and 2003 (Herrmann et al. 2005) 
Tucker/Nicholson (1999) could not detect a permanent expansion of the Sahara desert in the 
Sahel region, but proved a fluctuation of the green vegetation boundary of up to 150 km which 
occurred when a wet year followed a preceding dry one. This fluctuation depends strongly on 
precipitation and was often misinterpreted as irreversible desertification in periods of droughts 
(Nicholson 2001). According to Nicholson (2001) there is a full recovery of the land productiv-
ity at the end of the drought period. Studies in Namibia show a total misclassification of land 
cover  types  caused  by  rainfall  variability  when  using  standard  remote  sensing  techniques 
(Wagenseil/Samimi 2006, 2007). And this is true for the whole Sahel region, since its vegeta-
tion mainly depends on seasonal rainfall. 
All remote sensing studies demonstrate that there was neither a progressing shift of the Sahara 
desert southwards, nor a large-scale expansion of less productive land in the Sahel region. Of 
course, this does not necessarily mean that degradation and the replacement of vegetation is 
absent on a local scale, as studies in the 80s demonstrate (Nicholson 2001). 
The most recent global approach to assess land degradation called GLADIS (Global Land Deg-
radation Information System), is done by LADA and is still in a beta status. LADA defines land 
degradation as “the reduction in the capacity of the land to provide ecosystem goods and ser-
vices over a period of time for its beneficiaries” (Nachtergaele et al. 2010). GLADIS is working 
with a model, which uses a variety of input-variables from a database and produces several indi-
ces to assess the degradation status. Data included in the model are land use information and a 
background database containing ecosystem processes, goods and services related to vegetation, 
biodiversity, soil, water, society and economy. It then processes all mentioned variables sepa-
rately, as a status or a process (Nachtergaele et al. 2010). A major criticism may be the quality 
and spatial resolution of the input data and the suitability of a global-scale model for the situa-
tion on a regional level. The overall approach is, however, promising and may give useful hints 
about degradation which then should be tested on a regional or local level. 
The model is available for the public at http://lprapp11.fao.org:8080/glad_res/. Outputs for the 
Western Sahel mainly reveal poor biodiversity, soil quality, water resources, biomass and eco-
nomic production and a moderate social status, but the development of the parameters seem to 
remain generally stable or even show a positive trend (fig. 8). The indices show a low to very 
low status of the ecosystem services and a mostly severe and very severe biophysical status. The  
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land degradation index ranges from moderate improvements to high degradation, while the ser-
vices and goods affected indicate only soil. The land degradation impact index measuring the 
effect of poverty ranges from low to high in the Western Sahel. 
Assessing land degradation is much more complex than often thought, and expert assessments, 
remotely sensed time series and model outputs can hardly cope with the dynamics found in Sa-
helian countries. Changes in species distribution, encroachment of undesirable species, dust 
generation and soil compaction are hard to determine with models and remote sensing. Also the 
social complexity and political interests are not easy to incorporate. However, Herrmann/Hut-
chinson (2005) demonstrate that the context of the desertification debate is changing and high-
light the importance of an interdisciplinary approach which includes the ecological and social 
aspects of the research areas.  
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Figure 8: GLADIS model output for Western Africa (based on http://lprapp11.fao.org: 
8080/glad_res/)  
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3.4  Role of Agriculture 
Farming is the main source of income for most of the inhabitants of the Sahel with millet and 
sorghum as the major crops. Most low and middle-income households are active in subsistence 
farming, which is almost entirely reliant on the rainy season between June and October. Espe-
cially in the northern Sahel, many people live as semi-nomads, farming and feeding livestock in 
the north during the rainy season and trekking to the wetter south to find better grazing lands 
during the dry season (Hammer 2005).  
As already stated, agricultural lands in the Western Sahel have dramatically increased over the 
last 50 years. Population pressure and new techniques lead to the exploitation of new regions, 
intensification of cropping, deforestation and overgrazing. Overuse of land for agricultural pur-
poses plays a significant role in land degradation and is a main issue of climate change theories 
as well.  
 
Rainfed Agriculture 
Expansion  of  rainfed  agriculture  started  with  the  cessation  of  slavery  which  encouraged  a 
northward  drift  of  agricultural  populations into  formerly  hostile  regions  (National  Research 
Council 1984). Mali and other Sahel countries reported an 80% increase in rainfed crop produc-
tion between 1952 and 1975.Those results were achieved at the expense of fallow periods and 
lead to a reduction of natural vegetation like trees and shrubs, which are also used for construc-
tion and as fire wood (National Research Council 1984). In many areas, agricultural develop-
ment has focused on the production of cash crops such as groundnut, resulting in a serious loss 
of soil structure and fertility. Soils in the semi-arid zone are mostly fragile and infertile with 
very little organic material. Harvesting crops without the use of fertilizers or longer fallow peri-
ods removes essential nutrients. Deforestation and cultivation destabilizes the soil structure and 
exposes it to wind- and water-erosion (Brandt et al. 2009). 
 
Irrigated Agriculture 
In addition to rainfed agriculture, irrigation schemes have been introduced in many basins of the 
Sahel like the Senegal River Valley, the Interior Delta of the Niger and the Lake Chad. In com-
bination with new technologies and fertilizers the yields have been increased, but new difficul-
ties were encountered. Insects and rodents consume large quantities of the crops, sheet erosion 
is caused by dry-season winds, soils become saline and the costs for fertilizers and irrigation 
schemes are hardly affordable (National Research Council 1984). 
 
Livestock  
Even if cattle is poorly adapted for Sahelian conditions (they require large quantities of water 
and  are  highly  susceptible  to  stress) and  declining  rainfall  and decreasing  vegetation  cover 
(some fodder species disappeared and were replaced by species requiring less water) lead to 
declining numbers in the 70s and 80s (National Research Council 1984), livestock plays still a 
key role for the economies of West African countries and livestock numbers are now increasing 
again. Of the entire sub-Saharan Africa, 25% of the cattle, 33% of the sheep, and 40% of the  
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goats live in the Sahel and West Africa (Zoundi/Hitimana 2008). And this clearly has consider-
able effects on the vegetation cover, especially around wells. Cattle increases the pressure on 
perennial grasses sometimes even eliminating them, they trample seedlings and compact soil, 
and also affect tree cover, as trees are used as fuel and building material by herders and as fod-
der (National Research Council 1984, Sissoko et al. 2010). The reduction of the vegetation 
cover in combination with soil compaction can also indirectly trigger degradation processes. At 
the start of the rainy season the surface can be sealed with wet soil particles. This might enhance 
surface  runoff  and  so  soil  erosion  and  a  reduction  of  water  infiltration,  resulting  in  lower 
groundwater levels. (National Research Council 1984). A recent study over a period of 27 years 
by Miehe et al. (2010) proved that grazing intensity has a considerable long term effect on land 
degradation, always interacting with rainfall dynamics. 
 
Climate and Agriculture 
In the 70s it was postulated that the huge expansion of agriculture into marginal zones and other 
human activities like animal husbandry affected the vegetation cover in such a way that the sa-
vannahs changed to deserts. The atmospheric circulation responded and strengthened the deserti-
fication processes (Giannini et al. 2008). This hypothesis is called “Charney's hypothesis” (Char-
ney et al. 1975) and states that land cover changes associated with human impact lead to an in-
crease in surface albedo which causes a decrease in precipitation again leading to a decrease in 
vegetation cover and an even greater enhancement of the the albedo. The results of this cycle are 
irreversible and lead to large-scale degradation, decreasing rainfall and severe droughts (Giannini 
et al. 2003). Meanwhile, this hypothesis is disproved by several studies, showing that changes in 
the sea surface temperature (SST) explain the droughts of the 70s and 80s (Giannini et al. 2003, 
2008). However, it still seems very likely that changes in the vegetation cover and hence changes 
in the surface albedo play a secondary role in the West African monsoon system and that the land 
surface response in its interaction with the  atmosphere  enhances effects  which  are remotely 
forced by the SST (Biasutti et al. 2009, Giannini et al. 2008, Paeth/Thamm 2007, Zeng 2003). 
 
3.5  Focus Senegal  
Climate, Environment, Land degradation 
Senegal is located in the transition zone between the Guinean rainfall regime with more than 
1000 mm/a in the southeast and the Sahelian zone in the north with less than 300 mm/a (fig. 2). 
Accordingly, the variability increases from south to north. As in other parts of the Sahel the 
rainfall pattern has been showing positive and negative anomalies for the last 100 years with the 
longest negative period from 1976 until 1993 (Mbow et al. 2008). Since then the rainfall recov-
ered slightly but did not yet reach previous amounts (fig. 9). However, 2009 and 2010 were 
among the wettest years ever recorded. Additionally, the observed high temporal and spatial 
variability is too high to draw final conclusions about the rainfall development (Mbow et al. 
2008). The seasonal and intra-seasonal rainfall variability frequently causes droughts but also 
flooding. In 1977 more than 3.7 million people were affected by droughts followed by a very 
dry period. Severe floods occurred in 1979 and 1982 affecting 950,000 respectively 1.2 million  
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people.  Floods  with  less  severe  impacts  happened  in  1998  (300,000),  1999  (95,000),  2002 
(284,000), 2005 (50,000) and 2007 (5,300) (Grote/Warner 2009: 9, Samimi et al. 2012). Both, 
droughts and high rainfall intensities with surface runoff and flooding are a cause of water scar-
city which is a strong limiting factor for rain-fed agricultural. 
Following the rainfall distribution, the south of Senegal is characterized by woody vegetation, 
various types of woodlands and savannah woodlands according to a classification by Stancioff 
et al. (1986) cited in Tappan et al. 2004). Northward the vegetation changes into shrubby vege-
tation types and steppes. Large areas in the central west are already dominated by agricultural 
land which is further expanded (Mbow et al. 2008, Tappan et al. 2004). UNEP (2008) mentions 
a decline of woody vegetation (forest in the UNEP report) from 48.6% to 45% in 2005. Accord-
ing to ANSD (2009a: 108) Senegal lost 50% of its tree cover. But these figures are controver-
sially discussed and spatially heterogeneous (see chap. 3, Tappan et al. 2004). Causes for the 
loss and degradation of woody cover are the expansion of agriculture, wildfires, charcoal pro-
duction and droughts. 
 
Figure 9: Development of annual rainfall for the Linguère region from 1901–2009 (data after 
Rudolf 1995) 
According to still used but much criticized reports, Senegal is one of the Western African coun-
tries most affected by land degradation (see chap. 3.3, fig. 6). According to GLASOD 24.93% 
of the land in Senegal is degraded, 15.95% very severely. 51% of Senegal’s population are af-
fected in these areas. As discussed above the FAO conducts the Land Degradation Assessment 
in Drylands (LADA) for which Senegal is among the six pilot countries. Therefore, degradation 
was intensively studied during the last years. Many reports and maps were produced in coopera-
tion  with  the  CSE  (Centre  de  Suivi  Ecologique)  showing  degradation  type,  degree,  extent, 
cause, rate, vegetation and topsoil loss as well as thematic maps showing the impact on produc-
tive services (fig. 10), improvements among others (http://www.lada-senegal.org/, http://www. 
fao.org/nr/lada/). Those national and local reports indicate that land degradation is present (CSE  
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2009), but also demonstrate that the authorities are aware of the problems and many programs 
like  protected  areas  and  reforestation  help  to  combat  land  degradation  in  the  Senegal 
(Ndiaye/Touré 2010). 
 
Figure 10: Land degradation in Senegal impacting the productive service (http://www.lada-
senegal.org) 
 
3.6  Focus Mali 
Climate, Environment, Land Degradation 
In Mali the rainfall decreases from more than 1000 mm in the Southeast to far below 100 mm in 
the arid parts of northern Mali (fig. 2). The Sahara-region with an arid and semi-arid climate and 
less than 200 mm per year covers up to 57% of the national territory. The Sahel represents 18% 
of the country and has a rainy season with 200–700 mm, while the southern parts (25% of Mali) 
receive around 1200 mm. As in most of the Sahel the rainfall shows strong annual variations 
underlaid by longer trends (fig. 11). During the 70s and 80s of the 20
th century the rainfall 
dropped far below average with a moderate recovery since then. For the Mopti region it seems 
that the rainfall is back to the range of the 1960s with extremely wet years in 2009 and 2010. 
Beside of droughts, floodings are prominent in the very variable climate of Mali. During severe 
floodings in 2007, observed in large areas of Western Africa, in Mali approx. 50,000 people 
were affected (Samimi et al. 2012). 
 
 
  
 
35 
 
Figure 11: Development of annual rainfall for the Mopti region from 1901–2009 (data after 
Rudolf 1995) 
Depending on the rainfall, the vegetation zones also show a south-north-gradient. In the south-
ern parts of Mali with a mean annual rainfall exceeding 1000 mm, savannah-forest mosaics are 
prominent. These are by far the most fertile areas, and the majority of the population is living 
there. Further north the coverage of woody species gets sparser with woodlands and woody 
savannahs. The main Sahel is dominated by shrubs and grassland while the north of Mali is a 
pure desert (fig. 12). 
 
Figure 12: Principle agro-ecological zones in Mali (modified after IER/LABOSEP 2000)  
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Mali is facing degradation problems as well. The population growth during the last decades 
causes pressure on traditional agriculture and causesfarming to spread into areas which are not 
suitable for agriculture. Sandy and stony soils, erosion by wind and water, droughts and flood 
events and an increased deforestation are putting pressure on the land. Due to a lack of research 
the current extent of land degradation is unclear. According to the GLASOD approach (see 
chap. 3.3), 20.66% of Mali suffer from land degradation. 11.74% are classified as very severely 
degraded which means a total of 146.787 km² affecting 22.9% of the population. 
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4   Migration in the West African Sahel  
 
4.1  Ruptures, persistence and new patterns of migration in and from West Africa 
Martin Doevenspeck 
 
The lack of comparative research and census data on migration has resulted in the perpetuation 
of a couple of myths about migration in Africa (Bakewell/de Haas 2007). In this regard, tena-
cious narratives of human trafficking as one of the most important migration forms, and the fear 
of an ‘invasion’ of Europe by West Africans who cross the Sahara need to be confronted with 
research results that paint a much more differentiated picture of migration dynamics. Castles 
(2009), Schapendonk (2010) and Sieveking/Fauser (2009), for example, show the multitude of 
different migration patterns and trajectories in (West) Africa. Research by the OECD (2006) and 
Spaan/van Moppes (2006) demonstrates that the majority of migrants move within the region 
instead of heading for Europe. The first two sections of this chapter sketch a general and histori-
cally informed picture of migration within West Africa and to Europe. This brief overview is 
followed by a more specific study of migration patterns in Mali, Senegal and the two study re-
gions within these countries.  
 
4.1.1 Migration within West Africa  
The prevailing pattern of intra-regional migration in West Africa was, and in an attenuated way, 
still is that of a North-South movement from the Sahelian landlocked countries Niger, Burkina 
Faso and Mali to the coastal states, especially to Côte d’Ivoire. “These coast-bound international 
migration patterns have often been reproduced inside countries, with people often moving from 
the relatively arid and underdeveloped inland zones to the often more humid and more prosper-
ous agricultural as well as urbanised zones, generally located in the south and, in the case of 
Senegal and Mauritania, west of countries” (de Haas 2007: 9). 
Like many other forms of migration in contemporary West Africa, the North-South pattern goes 
back  to the establishment of plantation  economies (cotton, cocoa,  coffee,  groundnut) during 
colonization from the late 19
th century onwards, and the related growth of urban seaports to ex-
port the agricultural commodities for processing in Europe. Cities such as Dakar, Abidjan, Accra 
or Lomé benefited from infrastructure investments, attracted migrants and became the capitals of 
the new nation states after independence. Simultaneously with this rural-urban migration, contin-
ued processes of agricultural colonization in the West African middle belt (Manshard 1986) and 
the conversion of the southern forests into plantations through migrants from the Sahel led to a 
comprehensive re-structuring of many rural areas in the West African coastal states.  
Influenced by colonial mobility patterns, the colonial language divide and pan-African policies, 
three predominant migration systems can be identified for West Africa for the period between 
independence and the early 1980s (Robin 1992, Adepojou 2005, Ndiaye/Robin 2010):  
1.  centripetal movements in the West Atlantic region with Senegal (and the groundnut basin) as 
the pole with the highest attractiveness  
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2.  transversal migration within the coastal zone (especially from Ghana) into the oil economy 
of Nigeria  
3.  reflexive movements between Côte d’Ivoire and to a lesser extent Ghana as receiving coun-
tries and Burkina and Mali as sending countries. 
As the first system was never that important, and since Nigeria experienced an economic and 
political decline, it was Côte d’Ivoire that remained the sole migration pole with overriding 
importance during the 1980s and early 1990s. The liberal immigration and land policies of Côte 
d’Ivoire’s long-time autocrat Felix Houphouët-Boigny allowed for chain migrations of hundred 
of thousands of migrants from Mali and Burkina Faso and many other neighbouring countries 
who in large part settled down permanently. The smallholder coffee and cacao economy of 
these immigrants was included in the system of circular migration (Cordell et al. 1996), with 
young men leaving their villages in the Sahel during the dry season to work in the southern 
plantations of their compatriots. But migration from the Sahel was directed not only to rural 
areas but also to the cities, especially to Abidjan, which became a West African melting pot, 
with people from the Sahel working mainly in the service and construction sector. 
Civil war and economic decline in Côte d’Ivoire and its neighbouring states profoundly changed 
West African migration patterns from the mid-1990s on. Three main features characterize the 
new migration landscape: a diversification of destinations within sub-Saharan Africa, with coun-
tries such as Gabon and South Africa attracting more and more migrants from the region, the 
rise of pan-African Libya as a new migration pole for West Africans, and, linked to the increase 
in trans-Sahara migration, the development of countries such as Niger, Mali and Senegal from 
pure sending countries to transit countries (Bakewell/de Haas 2007).  
 
4.1.2 Migration to Europe 
Even if sub-Saharan migration to the European Union is increasing, the numbers are still very 
low compared to migration from the Maghreb or Eastern Europe, and do not correspond to the 
loud discourse of an ‘invasion’ (see de Haas 2008). Furthermore, the debate often ignores that 
Europe is not the only destination for international migration from Africa. North America (Tho-
mas 2011), the Gulf states (Pelican/Tattah 2009), and increasingly China (Bodomo/Ma 2010) 
attract important numbers of African migrants. However, the increase in West African migration 
to Europe is closely linked to the decline of Côte d’Ivoire and the rise of Libya as a new migra-
tion pole. The UN embargo against Libya and its international isolation led to a re-orientation of 
the country’s foreign policy with President Gaddafi re-inventing himself as an African leader. 
Libya’s pan-African policy included massive investments in sub-Saharan Africa, military aid 
for the Sahel countries, a re-vitalization of the African Union, and, not least, the opening of 
Libya’s labour market. By the early 2000s Libya was a major destination for West African mi-
grants who were mainly given manual and unskilled work (Pliez 2000). Though Libya’s immi-
gration policy was always arbitrary and unpredictable, with regular mass expulsions and, at a 
later stage, the establishment of detention camps for migrants as a sign of goodwill for a Europe 
afraid of an ‘invasion’, the country was still in need of immigrant labour. The violent clashes 
between Libyans and sub-Saharan Africans in 2000 (Pliez 2004), and the subsequent general  
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anti-immigrant atmosphere, with migration becoming increasingly irregular, prompted “a partial 
westward shift of trans-Saharan migration routes towards Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. From 
there increasing numbers have joined Maghrebis in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean. In 
addition, sub-Saharan migrants in Libya have increasingly tried to cross to Europe from the 
Libyan coast” (de Haas 2008: 1308). It does not seem to be sheer coincidence that in 2000 for 
the first time European border guards detained more sub-Saharan Africans than migrants form 
North Africa. In this regard, sub-Saharan migration to Europe can be interpreted as a connection 
between the revived trans-Saharan and the trans-Mediterranean migration systems. It remains to 
be seen what impacts the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime will have for these interconnected 
migration systems, as well as for migration within West Africa. 
With hundreds of thousands of West Africans in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, there is 
undoubtedly a significant potential for migration to Europe. However, North Africa cannot only 
be considered as a springboard to Europe, since many migrants prefer to stay there. This is ei-
ther because North Africa was their primary destination, or because they prefer to stay after a 
failed attempt to enter Europe, instead of returning to their countries of origin (de Haas 2007). 
Furthermore, as de Haas (2008) points out, the majority of irregular sub-Saharan migrants have 
nothing to do with the boat migrants who leave the North African coasts, but they are migrants 
who have entered Europe legally and overstayed their visas. For a long time, the choice of des-
tination in Europe was structured by the colonial divide, with France and the UK being the main 
receiving countries. Since the late 1990s, states such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser 
extent Germany, also became important host countries for West Africans.  
 
 
4.2  Focus Senegal  
Victoria van der Land, Joel Fourier 
 
Senegal is experiencing a high population growth at a rate of 2.4% per annum leading to a 
change in the population structure due to a rising share of young people in the country. Since 
1950 Senegal’s population has increased from 2.4 million to currently 12.9 million. Projections 
indicate that the population will have doubled to around 26 million people by 2050 (UN Popula-
tion Division). One important factor to be considered is the high illiteracy rate of 58% (ANSD 
2010) and the particularly poor education of the female population. Almost half of the people 
(42%)  live  in  cities.  Urban  population  growth  is  remarkable;  the  annual  urban  population 
growth rate for the period 2010–2015 is estimated at 3.25% (UNESA 2009). Senegal’s popula-
tion is highly mobile: People move within the country, mostly from rural to urban areas and 
emigrate to neighbouring African countries as well as to other continents, mostly to Europe. 
 
4.2.1 Internal Migration  
Internal migration still counts for the biggest part of movements in Senegal. According to the 
National Population Census (RGPH-III), 15.3% of the total Senegalese population lived in a 
place other than they were born (lifelong internal migration) in 2002, while 3.4% migrated in  
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the last five years prior to the survey (recent internal migration) (ANSD 2006: 47–50). Emi-
grants account for 1.7% of the population (ANSD 2006, 2009).
4  
In 2002, Dakar, Diourbel and Thiès were the most popular destinations for recent and lifelong 
internal migrants (see table 3). The regions of Kaolack, Ziguinchor and Louga lost the most 
inhabitants with a view to recent migration (ANSD 2006: 51). Internal migration is mostly tak-
ing place from rural to urban areas (rural exodus). Urban areas became more popular as destina-
tions between 1988 and 2002, and this is still true for recent migration (ibid. 53).  
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Bilan 
Dakar    -504  4226  10343  3022  1713  3200  2350  1640  -614  7967  33343 
Diourbel  504    981  2469  -155  4656  -51  -45  -202  2778  250  11185 
Fatick  -4226  -981    740  -311  347  -103  731  -287  -1332  275  -5147 
Kaolack  -10343  -2469  -740    -2510  -138  -80  -504  -1128  -3121  -16  -21049 
Kolda  -3022  155  311  2510    -66  62  93  23  -1127  -1610  -2671 
Louga  -1713  -4656  -347  138  66    -152  -457  -215  -1139  159  -8316 
Matam  -3200  51  103  80  -62  152    16  -321  -492  -3  -3676 
Saint Louis  -2350  45  -731  504  -93  457  -16    -281  -486  281  -2670 
Tambacounda  -1640  202  287  1128  -23  215  321  281    93  284  1148 
Thiès  614  -2778  1332  3121  1127  1139  492  486  -93    2750  8190 
Ziguinchor  -7967  -250  -275  16  1610  -159  3  -281  -284  -2750    -10337 
Table 3: Balance of internal recent migration (Source: ANSD 2006: 52) 
Women count for 57% of internal migrants. Singles and people younger than 29 years are the 
most likely to move (ANSD 2004: 218/221). People with lower education tend to move more 
frequently when we look at recent migration (ibid. 224).  
Rural exodus is frequently described as the most worrying type of migration in Senegal, since it 
contributes to an unequal distribution of settlements and to the overcrowding of urban areas. 
The phenomenon of rural outmigration can be observed since the agricultural crisis in the 1970s 
and has considerably increased ever since (ANSD 2006: 46). Several studies regard rural-urban 
migration as a result of increasing land degradation and/or droughts, as well as an effect of de-
creasing harvests resulting in harsher living conditions in rural areas (Some 2009: 65, Bleibaum 
2009, Henry et al. 2004). In addition, it is argued that rural areas often lack job opportunities 
and adequate infrastructure with regard to administration, sanitation as well as cultural and edu-
                                                       
4   Recent data for migration in Senegal is hardly available. The most current national data is based on the household 
survey ESAM-II (2001) and the third national population census RGPH-III (2002).  
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cational institutions. Thus rural-urban migration is often also related to aspirations for a better 
life (Some 2009: 65). However, the structural conditions and individual motivations for migra-
tion are manifold and this will be analyzed in the micle project in greater detail.  
 
4.2.2 International Migration  
Historically, Senegal was mainly considered as a country of destination for African migrants but 
its importance as a country of immigration has decreased over time.
5 In 2002, most of the for-
eign residents in Senegal were Africans (85%), originating mainly from Western African coun-
tries (74%), like Guinea (23%), Mauretania (6%) and Mali (6%). Foreign residents also came 
from Europe (9%), mainly France (3%) and Central African countries (8.5%) (ANSD 2004, Di 
Bartolomeo et al. 2010, ECOWAS 2006: 12).  
Senegal has been important for transit migration to Maghreb or to European countries due to its 
geographical position, particularly for people from West Africa (Adepojou 2005: 2, Some 2009: 
33, Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010: 4). This status has come to an end since the end of the boat mi-
grations to the Canary Islands. In contrast, Mali and Niger are still important transit countries. 
However, since the mid-1970s Senegal has become an important country of emigration as con-
sequence of difficult living conditions and as a result of the success stories of earlier Senegalese 
emigrants (UNESA 2011).
6 It is argued that at the beginning, international migration was a reac-
tion to severe droughts and a financial crisis, later it became a model for social rise and a source 
for family reunion (Fall 2003, Gerdes 2007: 1, Bleibaum 2009).  
Senegalese emigration has primarily been a migration to other African countries, not least be-
cause Senegal is a member of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) 
and part of a free circulation area covering fifteen countries
7 (ECOWAS 2006: 10). In the 1990s 
immigration to other African countries decreased due to economic and political instabilities in 
the neighbouring countries and led to a change towards intercontinental migration. In 2001, 
more than half of the Senegalese emigrants chose destinations outside the African continent (see 
table 2). The main destination was Europe (46%; mostly to France, Italy and Spain) and 7.5% 
went to the United States and Canada. But other African countries still play an important role as 
destination for 44 cent of the emigrants: one third of which went to UEMOA (Union Économi-
que et Monétaire Ouest Africaine)
8 states, with Ivory Coast as the most popular destination with 
almost half of the people. Another 30% immigrated to other African countries, with Gambia and 
                                                       
5   The number of immigrants varies depending on the sources: Figures for immigration from the National Agency 
for Statistics and Demography in Senegal (ANSD) are lower than international data. Immigration rates: ANSD: 
1.2% of the population in 2001; 0.8% in 2002 (ANSD 2009: 34); UNDP: 2.3% in 2000, 2% in 2005 (UNPD 
2009); World Bank: 2.8% in 2005 (Ratha/Xu 2008); IOM: 1.6% of the total population were immigrants in 2010 
(IOM 2010).  
6   The estimates for period from 2005 to 2010 show a net migration rate of –2.3 (UNESA 2011). 
7   Member states of ECOWAS are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Niger are suspended. 
8   Member states of UEMOA are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo.  
  42 
Mauritania as the  most  popular countries  (ANSD  2004: 233).
9  In  addition,  more and  more 
Senegalese leave for Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco for temporary immigration and in the 
hope for an opportunity to cross the Mediterranean Sea (Some 2009).  
Sex of emigrants 
Male  Female 
Total  Destination 
countries  
Number  Percentage  Number  Percentage  Number  Percentage 
Africa 
Thereof: UEMOA- 
countries 
61 207 
18 484 
43.2 
13.1 
12 759 
4 648 
47.8 
17.4 
73965 
23 132 
43.9 
13.8 
Europe  66 730  46.9  10 986  41.1  77 715  46 
USA/Canada  10 228  7.2  2 404  9  12 632  7.5 
Others  3 810  2.7  417  1.6  4 227  2.5 
n/a  158  0.1  151  0.6  309  0.2 
TOTAL  142 131  100  26 716  100  168 847   100 
Table 4: Destination countries for Senegalese emigrants, 2001 (Source: Own illustration com-
piled on the basis of ANSD 2004: 233) 
People from rural areas rather migrate to other African countries, while people from urban areas 
prefer Europe and the USA or Canada (ANSD 2004: 232). More than half of the migrants live 
in cities before leaving the country.  
Emigrants are mainly male (84%), younger than 35 years old (72%) and singles (47%) (ANSD 
2004). Those who move internationally tend to be better educated and to have higher levels of 
initial income than those who do not (migrant selectivity) (UNDP 2009: 12). However, the edu-
cational profile of emigrants differs between destination countries: while Italy and Spain are 
destinations for low skilled workers, Canada and the US receive mostly highly-skilled emi-
grants. At the beginning of the millennium, Senegalese emigrants were more likely to be em-
ployed in low-skilled jobs (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010: 3). Regarding the return, migrants who 
moved to other African countries are more likely to return and after a shorter time period than 
migrants who left the continent (Lessault/Mezger 2010: 6).  
 
4.2.3 Aspects of Contemporary Migration  
Migration is significantly shaping the Senegalese society: at least 70% of all Senegalese house-
holds include at least one migrant family member (ANSD 2004). In the 1990s, the economic 
crisis and the decline of the peanut industry enhanced the trend of urbanisation and immigration 
to Europe. Internal migration still counts for the biggest part of movements in Senegal and is 
mainly directed to urban centres (ANSD 2006, Hitimana et al. 2011). The traditionally male 
dominated (commercial) internal and international migration becomes increasingly feminized. 
Today, women make up a significant share of migrants who move independently to fulfill their 
                                                       
9   The data for emigrants also varies between different sources, especially between national and international data 
sources. The ESAM-II states a figure of 168,847 emigrants (1.7% of the population) in 2001.  
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own economic needs (Adepojou 2004). Migration is in many cases a collective matter where the 
decision for migration as well as its funding is taken collectively (ANSD 2004: 239). Seasonal 
labour migration is deeply rooted in West Africa far beyond colonial times. This migration type 
has thus also a strong tradition in Senegal and often states a (coping) strategy for rural house-
holds to diversify and secure income (de Haan and Zoomers 2005: 40). Unfortunately, data on 
this issue are scarce.  
Emigration can lead to economic advantages for households through impulses for development 
by  transferred  remittances  and  remigration  (Angenendt  2009:  27).  The  funds  received  from 
abroad have contributed to increasing the Senegalese per capita income by close to 60% com-
pared with households that do not receive remittances from abroad (Diagne and Diane, 2008). 
However, the effects of the transferred funds seem to be much higher in urban than in rural areas 
(Gerdes  2007:  5).  The  recorded  remittances  annually  transferred  from  Senegalese’s  abroad 
reached USD 874 million in 2007 and has almost quadrupled since 2000 accounting for 7% of 
the Senegalese GDP (IOM 2009: 122). Thus, the government tends to regard emigration as re-
lief for the job market and as development factor due to remittances, people’s additional qualifi-
cation gained abroad and the investments taken by the returning migrants (Fall et al. 2010: 31, 
Gerdes 2007: 7). While supporting regular migration, the government seeks to limit irregular 
migration flows with the help of awareness rising campaigns and by promoting employment 
opportunities (Fall et al. 2010: 13). In the Senegalese general assessment, the emigrant, also 
called by the Wolof-word “Modou-Modou”, is regarded as a symbol of success. Emigration to 
Europe remains thus highly desirable among young people to gain social acceptance and finan-
cial success (Fall et al. 2010: 32). 
 
4.2.4 Study Region Linguère  
The department of Linguère is one of three departments in the administrative region of Louga in 
the northwest of the country (see map in chap. 1). In 2006, Linguère had an estimated popula-
tion of 218,940 which means 14 habitants per km² of which 81% were considered as rural popu-
lation  (ANSD  2007:  18).  The  Fulani  (49%)  and  Wolof  (42%)  constitute  the  largest  ethnic 
groups in the department of Linguère. Here, the proportion of the Fulani is higher than in other 
regions of the country, because the region is part of a silvopastoral zone and the Fulani are tradi-
tionally stock farmers or nomadic people (ibid: 23). About 36% of the population in Louga lives 
in poverty (IMF 2007: 13). The local economy strongly depends on agricultural activities and 
livestock breeding. Linguère is the department with the highest share of livestock (48%) in the 
region of Louga and the most widely grown agricultural product is peanuts (ANSD 2007: 55). 
The unemployment rate in the region is estimated at 8.4% (ibid. 41).  
Louga region is characterized by high population mobility (nomadism and transhumance of the 
Fulani, international migration).
10 It has a distinct negative migration balance: in 2002, the bal-
ance was minus 125,702 people or 20% of the population for lifelong migration and minus 
                                                       
10   The description of migration patterns refers to the region of Louga, since there is hardly specific information 
available for the department of Linguère.  
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8,316 people or 7% of the population for recent migration (ANSD 2006: 49–52). Internal migra-
tion from Louga benefits all regions of Senegal, especially urban areas like Diourbel, Dakar and 
Thiès (ANSD 2006, 2007). Development projects have been implemented in Louga to reduce 
(international) migration and thus contributing to the farmers’ settlement and to an intensifi-
cation of livestock for development in the region (ANSD 2007: 13). The impacts of these pro-
jects are something that needs further investigation.  
 
 
4.3  Focus Mali  
Clemens Romankiewicz 
 
The landlocked République du Mali is one of the ten poorest countries in the world (rank 160 
out of 169 countries) and is experiencing an exceptionally high population growth of 3.6%. 
Since 1950 its population has grown from 4.3 million to currently 14.5 million (INSTAT 2009, 
UNDP 2010). The extremely young age structure and low female education, associated with 
high fertility rates, are important reasons why the population is expected to more than double 
over the coming four decades (UNESA 2011, World Bank 2010). While the major part (66%) of 
the Malian population still lives in rural areas, the growth of urban centres has remained at a 
high level since the 1950s and was estimated at 4.8% in 2005 (World Bank 2010). According to 
the EMMU
11 about 200,000 migrations
12 per year were registered between 1988 and 1992, with 
360,000 births and 130,000 deaths annually, which leads Bocquier and Diarra (1999) to the 
conclusion that migration in Mali is a major demographic phenomenon. More recently, a survey 
carried out in 2005
13 found out that 57% of the households had at least one household member 
who was a migrant at the time of the survey (WFP et al. 2006). Moreover, Malian migration 
patterns  are  a  complex  and  vast  field  which  can  be  examined  from  different  perspectives. 
Hence, the following chapter will give a brief overview of migration scales and selected issues 
of migration performance in Mali. 
 
4.3.1 Internal migration 
In the early 1990s internal migration in Mali accounted for 51% of its total permanent migration 
(Boquier/Diarra 1999). More recent surveys also underline the importance of internal movements 
in Mali, even though the preference of destinations differs among the regions (see table 5). 
 
 
 
                                                       
11   Enquête Malienne sur les Migrations et l’Urbanisation (EMMU) 1992–1993 (Boquier & Diarra 1999). 
12  In the study, permanent migration was defined as a change of place of residence for six months or more (Boc-
quier & Diarra 1999). 
13   Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) 2005. These data only cover rural areas, 
where 2,074 households in 209 villages were surveyed (WFP et al. 2006).  
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destinations of migrants (%) 
region 
 
migration 
rate (%)  rural  
areas  Bamako  other cities  
in Mali 
other  
countries  
in Africa 
outside  
Africa 
Kayes  0,16  8,9  19,6  16,3  31,5  23,8 
Koulikoro  0,12  15,2  25,1  29,9  27,8  2,0 
Sikasso  0,16  6,6  26,2  21,4  39,7  6,2 
Ségou  0,12  7,9  46,2  24,2  21,7  0,0 
Mopti  0,16  22,6  30,7  15,0  28,0  3,7 
Tombouctou  0,32  6,6  50,6  16,8  24,8  1,1 
Gao  0,23  4,3  25,0  30,1  35,9  4,7 
Kidal  0,34  19,0  2,4  11,9  66,7  0,0 
Table 5: Destinations of emigrants according to region of origin in Mali, 2005 (Ballo 2009: 
122). Source: Merabet/Gendreau (2007), database: CFSVA, 20053 
In Mali, approximately 80% of internal migrations between 1988–1992 were between rural and 
urban environments (Bocquier/Diarra 1999). As table 5 illustrates, Bamako and other Malian 
cities alone account for a major part of migrations from rural households in all regions except 
Kidal. The most outstanding role in Malian migration patterns is played by Bamako, which is 
the principal attraction pole for internal migrants; in 2004 33% of its population consisted of 
migrants (Ballo 2009). In 2009, approximately 12% of the Malian population (1.8 million peo-
ple) lived in Bamako, accounting for about 40% of the Malian urban population (INSTAT 2009, 
Worldbank 2010). The migration flows to Bamako are also said to explain the rapid growth of 
the Malian urban population, which rose from 1.1 million (17%) in 1976 to 4.1 million (30,5%) 
in 2005 (Worldbank 2010). Nevertheless, other cities also followed the rhythm of Bamako’s 
growth during the last thirty years (Ballo 2009). 
The Ségou region, with its Office du Niger for horticulture and rice production, is a second 
point of attraction, as it receives more than 40% of internal migrants (Ballo 2009, Bocquier/ 
Diarra 1999). Sikasso, the southernmost region of the country, is characterized by very favour-
able conditions for rain-fed agriculture and constitutes an important rural destination for internal 
migration, especially from Ségou, Koulikoro and Mopti (Diarra/Cissé 2003). In Mopti, immi-
gration and emigration are estimated to lie quite close together, with a moderate migration defi-
cit. Emigrants are mainly oriented towards Bamako and rural destinations in the south. Migra-
tion in Mali’s northern regions, like Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, is influenced by migrants transit-
ing the Sahara, and partly by the political conflict in the north (Sieveking/Fauser 2009). Tim-
buktu has the highest migration deficit in the country, with most migrants leaving for Bamako 
and Mopti. This emigration bias is further reinforced by a low attraction potential for immi-
grants (Diarra/Cissé 2003). In a condensed and over-simplistic manner, it can be said that inter-
nal migration in Mali follows its economic north-south gradient. Thus, people leave arid regions 
in the north for economically more developed, highly productive agricultural regions and urban 
centres in the south (Ballo 2009, Sieveking/Fauser 2009).   
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4.3.2 International Migration 
Considering its net migration ratio of -2.4/1000 inhabitants in the period 2000 to 2005, Mali is 
one of West Africa’s typical emigration countries (Ballo 2009). However, most of its migration 
flows are due to exchange with other West African countries. African countries account for 84% 
of emigration from, and 93% of immigration to Mali (Merabet/Gendreau 2007). This predomi-
nance of regional migration flows is promoted by the socio-economic mobility of certain ethnic 
groups, especially nomadic groups, the freedom of movement in the ECOWAS zone, and the 
geographical position of Mali between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, which makes it 
one of the most important transition zones for African migrants on their way to Europe (Ballo 
2009, Merabet/Gendreau 2007, Sieveking/Fauser 2009). 
 
Immigration into Mali  
Immigration plays a secondary role in Malian migration patterns. In 2007 immigrants only 
counted for 1.5% of the population (Ballo 2009). In 1998, Mali’s immigrants mainly came from 
Ivory Coast (44%), Burkina Faso (13%), Guinea (9%), Senegal (7%), Mauritania (4%) and Ni-
ger (3%) (Merabet/Gendreau 2007). The high proportion of immigration from Ivory Coast is 
mainly attributed to the rising number of returning former Malian emigrants. Especially after 
the coup d’état in 1999, the economic crisis in 2002, and more recently the crisis and violence 
after the 2010 presidential elections, xenophobia and political opposition against immigrants in 
this major destination of Malian migrants led to the return of more than 40,000 Malians in the 
years 2003–2004 (Ballo 2009, Martin et al. 2002, Sieveking/Fauser 2009). Furthermore, politi-
cal stability and the dynamic nature of certain economic sectors, such as construction, transport 
or communications, promoted return migration to Mali (Ballo 2009). But returns and increasing 
deportations from Europe, other African countries, and especially North African countries have 
also influenced immigration to Mali during the past decade. More than 80% of the returnees be-
tween 2002 and 2008 came from Algeria, Morocco and Libya (Ballo 2009, Merabet/Gendreau 
2007). The recent war against the Gaddafi regime in Libya caused more than ten thousand Mali-
ans to return to their country of origin. 
 
Emigration from Mali 
In the same way as neighbouring countries play an important role in immigration to Mali, most 
of the emigration flows are directed towards West Africa (see fig. 13). There seems to be an 
accelerating trend in emigration from Mali as from the 1990s. At the beginning of the millen-
nium, estimations ranged from 2.5 to 4 million Malians living abroad (approximately 25% of 
the total population), 2 to 3 million of whom are said to live in other African countries (Ballo 
2009, Merabet/Gendreau 2007, McDowell/de Haan 1997, Sieveking/Fauser 2009).  
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Figure 13: Malian emigrants according to destination in 2000  
(Source: adapted after Ballo 2009) 
The most important destination for Malian emigrants is Ivory Coast, and it is estimated that 1 to 
2.5 million Malians live in this neighbouring country (Ballo 2009, Merabet/Gendreau 2007). 
However, the impacts of the socio-political crisis and feelings against foreigners translated into a 
decrease in the number of Malian emigrants to Ivory Coast between 1988–1992 (53%) and the 
year 2000 (32%). Furthermore, Ivory Coast was also an important destination for human traffick-
ing from Mali.
14 By the turn of the millennium, rising numbers of migrants to Europe and the 
USA could be observed (Martin et al. 2002, McDowell/de Haan 1997). Approximately 200,000 
Malian migrants are estimated to live in Europe, the majority of them in France (Merabet/Gen-
dreau 2007, Sieveking/Fauser 2009). With regard to the migrants' region of origin (see also table 
5), migration to countries outside Africa in 2005 was by far most significant in Kayes (23.8%), 
followed by Sikasso (6.2%), Gao (4.7%) and Mopti (3.7%) (Ballo 2009, WFP et al. 2006). 
 
4.3.3 Aspects of contemporary migration 
Scales of migration flows into and from Mali elaborated above are further characterized by dif-
ferent processes and performances. The following section briefly illustrates two of these major 
issues, namely circular migration and the feminization of migration. 
 
Circular migration 
Findley (1994: 540) defines a circular migrant as a person who “stays away between one and six 
months and upon return participates in the economic and social life of the household”, whereas 
permanent migrants “stay away more than six months, do not return to participate as regular 
members in the life of the household and do not plan to return”. She further distinguishes short-
                                                       
14   During the years prior to 2002, approximately 15,000 children were sold and transferred by recruiters to work in 
Ivorian households and plantations. Human trafficking seems to be a growing phenomenon in West and Central 
Africa as a way of obtaining workers for rice fields, mines and in urban centres (Ballo 2009, Martin et al. 2002).  
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cycle patterns of labour migration to nearby destinations for a short period of time (less than a 
year) from long-cycle patterns of labour circulation with more distant or even foreign destina-
tions and a longer duration of two to three years (ibid.). 
In Mali, circular migration takes different shapes. Probably the best known is the mobile life-
style of nomadism and semi-nomadism, which is mainly characteristic of Fulani pastoralists and 
Tuareg nomads. Those groups perform circular migration, as they move between the Sahel re-
gion during the rainy season and areas closer to the Niger River in the south during the dry sea-
son (Ballo 2009, Krings 1982, Krings et al. 1988). In the past, there have been tendencies to 
abandon this mobile lifestyle due to political and social changes (for instance the expansion of 
irrigated rice fields, or the emigration of young Tuareg men to Ivory Coast), as well as recurrent 
droughts and growing population density which has resulted in many pastoralists moving to 
cities like Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao (Krings 1982, Krings et al. 1988). This form of circular 
migration persists to this day. 
Another important type of circular migration is the seasonal labour migration of young men 
(and an increasing number of women) after the rainy season, which may last for two or three 
years. This migration is mainly oriented towards year-round agriculturally productive regions 
and  cities.  Ivory  Coast  (especially  Abidjan)  has  always  been  an  important  destination,  but 
greater numbers have migrated to Bamako in recent times (Findley 1994, Merabet/Gendreau 
2007 Sieveking/Fauser 2009, WFP et al. 2006). 
 
Feminization of migration 
Whereas male migration has a long tradition in Malian society, the feminization of migration 
patterns has only emerged in this generation. According to the Enquête Permanente Auprès des 
Ménages (EPAM) of 2007, 56% of all migration flows are made up by women (Ballo 2009, 
Sieveking/Fauser 2009). 
However, female internal migration mainly occurs between urban localities and from rural areas 
to Bamako, whereas international migration is still mainly restricted to men. Hence the more 
distant the destination, the less women are concerned (Bocquier/Diarra 1999, Sieveking/Fauser 
2009, WFP et al. 2006). This is partly explained by the fact that the majority of men do not want 
to expose their women to Western values and thus refuse to support international migration of 
women (Martin et al. 2002). But also in the case of internal migration, many fear a disruption of 
cultural and social life, with a loss of moral authority, and therefore try to regulate female mi-
gration in their environment (Sieveking/Fauser 2009). 
Whereas these practices seem to hinder the potential economic activities of women, one may 
keep in mind that “through the diversification of migration patterns during the drought, families 
demonstrated their abilities to bend rigid social structures to the needs of the situation and are 
expected to do this again in future droughts” (Findley 1994: 551), which implies that the Malian 
population will always adapt their migration patterns to the prevailing situation. 
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4.3.4 The Study Region of Bandiagara 
The selected study area is located in the Mopti region in the centre of Mali, which in 2009 had 
two million inhabitants and a population density of 25 inh./km
2 (INSTAT 2009). The region is 
administratively subdivided into 8 cercles consisting of 108 communes. The most important 
urban centres are Mopti, Bandiagara, Djenné, Douentza and Ténenkou. Important aspects that 
guided the selection of the study region were high population mobility and noticeable trends in 
vegetation cover (“greening” or degradation phenomena) with the help of satellite images (see 
chap. 3).  
Research concentrates on the dryland zone including the Dogon plateau and the Séno plain 
around the town of Bandiagara (see chap. 1, fig. 1), which belongs to the semi-arid Sahel-Sudan 
region and is characterized by an annual precipitation of around 600mm and open shrub and tree 
savanna (MEA 2009). Rainfed agriculture, and to a certain extent vegetable gardening are the 
main economic activities. Productivity essentially depends on the amount of rainfall and the 
availability of wells, boreholes and small dams (MEA 2009). Population growth, overexploita-
tion of natural resources, recurrent droughts and soil erosion have resulted in the degradation of 
agricultural land and pasture, and the loss of vegetation cover and biodiversity in the region 
(ibid.).  
The Dogon and Fulani are the predominant ethnic groups. Both groups are very mobile and so 
migration is an important part of local livelihoods. Results from EMMU
15 show that the migra-
tion deficit in the Mopti region for both international and internal movements is among the 
highest in the country (Bocquier/Diarra 1999). Data from a survey
16 in 2005 reveal that 61% of 
the interviewed households in the Mopti region mentioned one or more migrating members 
(WFP et al. 2006), which indicates a long tradition of labour migration (Sieveking and Fauser 
2009). Besides migration to Bamako (31%) and other African countries (28%), rural areas and 
villages (23%) are important destinations for migrants from the Mopti region (WFP et al. 2006, 
Merabet/Gendreau 2007). 
 
                                                       
15   Enquête Malienne sur les Migrations et l’Urbanisation (EMMU) 1992–1993 (Bocquier & Diarra 1999). 
16   Analyse de la sécurité alimentaire et de la vulnérabilité (CFSVA) (WFP 2006).  
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5  Migration Policies 
Diana Hummel 
 
The mobility of people is strongly influenced by different international, regional and national 
political frameworks. Policies and legal frameworks can encourage or discourage migration and 
thus, the political perception of population mobility and migration has determining effects on 
the capability of people to migrate. The following chapter gives an overview of the most impor-
tant policies, institutional arrangements and legal frameworks that impact the mobility of people 
in Mali und Senegal. 
 
5.1  International and Regional Policies  
Several international, regional and national initiatives, treaties and events focusing on migration 
have had a “catalytic effect on migration discourse and policy in Africa” (Adepojou 2010: 5) 
over the past decade. At the international level, the report of the Global Commission for Interna-
tional Migration (2005), the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (2006) 
and the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Brussels 2007, Manila 2008 and Ath-
ens 2009 contributed to the international policy debate on migration (ibid.).  
The “International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants Workers and 
Members of Their Families”, adopted in 1990 by the UN General Assembly, entered into force 
in July 2003. It represents the most comprehensive international instrument to provide legal 
protection for migrants. Its primary objective is to protect migrant workers and their families, a 
particularly vulnerable population, from exploitation and from violation of their human rights. 
The Convention defines the rights of migrant workers under two main headings. Firstly, it de-
fines that human rights of migrant workers and members of their families are applicable to all 
migrant workers, undocumented ones included. Secondly, it defines other rights of migrant 
workers and members of their families applicable only to migrant workers in a regular situation.  
An important international programme is “Migration for development in Africa” (MIDA), a 
capacity-building programme which seeks to mobilize competencies acquired by African nation-
als abroad for the benefit of Africa’s development. It was launched by the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM) in order to strengthen its capacity building efforts in assisting African 
countries to benefit from the investment they have made in their nationals. The overall objective 
is to assist in strengthening the institutional capacities of African governments to manage and 
realise their development goals through the transfer of relevant skills, human, financial and other 
resources held by Africans in the Diaspora for use in development programmes in Africa. Since 
many African nationals in the Diaspora are applying their qualifications and skills in developed 
countries in Europe and North America it is argued that such qualifications and skills should be 
brought back into the mainstream of development on the African continent.  
In 2002 the “Africa Labour Migration Policy Initiative” was established by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) in concert with the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment) agenda (ILO 2002). It aims at assisting countries (governments and social partners) in 
developing policy frameworks and effective practical structures and mechanisms related to chal- 
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lenges and opportunities of labour migration. Particular emphasis is on improving data on actual 
conditions and needs, identifying effective model practice, capacity building, and providing 
technical assistance to tripartite partners, both at national and regional levels. It also aims at 
facilitating the coherent development of national and regional policy, legislation and practice to 
regulate labour migration as a factor for development and integration. 
At  the  regional  African  level,  important  guidelines  include  the  African  Union’s  Strategic 
Framework for a Policy on Migration (2001), and the ECOWAS (Economic Community of 
West African States) common approach on migration (2006). The European Union (EU) and 
African Union (AU) have held a series of meetings to address issues relating to regular and ir-
regular migration between the two regions: the Euro-African conference on Migration and De-
velopment (2006), the Follow-up Meeting of the Rabat Process (2007) in Madrid, and the EU-
African summit in Lisbon (2008).  
Mali and Senegal participate in regional integration initiatives as member states of the African 
Union, the ECOWAS, the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union and the 
CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan countries). One of the main objectives of CEN-SAD 
is to achieve economic unity through the implementation of a free trade area including the free 
movement of people and goods (Community of Sahel-Saharan States 2012).  
The ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Estab-
lishment of May 29
th 1979 is regarded as a “benchmark in sub-Saharan Africa” (Adepojou 
2008: 28, Adepojou 2010: 5). It sets out standards for liberalising the intra-community mobility 
of labour. Within fifteen years from the date at which the protocol came into force, i.e. by 1994, 
the rights of entry, residence and establishment should be progressively established. However, 
this has not been achieved. A meeting in Abuja held in March 2000 aimed at creating a border-
less sub-region and abolishing mandatory residence permits. In April 2000, the granting of the 
maximum 90-day period of stay to ECOWAS citizens by immigration officials at entry points 
took effect. The ECOWAS passport is supposed to serve as a symbol of unity and shall progres-
sively replace national passports (Adepojou 2008: 28).  
The ECOWAS common approach on migration (2006) made it possible to advance the Protocol 
on the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment from 1979. A 
special Task Force on Migration was established, and a Department for the Free Movement of 
Persons was created after the transformation of ECOWAS into a commission. The approach 
comprises the following fundamental principles: 
–  better implementation of the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of 
Residence and Establishment; 
–  combating human trafficking and providing humanitarian assistance; 
–  harmonizing policies and bilateral agreements with additional countries; 
–  promoting the adoption of migration policies by ECOWAS member states, together with 
harmonized migration management and sector development policies; 
–  protection of the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; 
–  ensuring the implementation of protocols relevant to international conventions; 
–  recognising the gender dimension of migration (Adepojou 2008: 8).  
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This approach was adopted at the 33
rd Summit of Heads of State and Government in January 
2008. Furthermore, an action plan for the ECOWAS Common Approach was formulated in-
cluding a series of measures putting the principles into practice (Gnisci 2008: 93f.).
 17  
 
5.2  Migration in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers  
One key instrument in national development policy formation relevant for Mali and Senegal are 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which refer to the different policy fields relevant 
for the interactions between environmental change and migration which have to be considered 
with respect to poverty reduction, development policies, environmental policies, as well as mi-
gration policies. PRSPs are national statements of development and poverty-reduction policy; 
they were introduced in 1999 by the World Bank and the IMF as a new framework to enhance 
domestic accountability for efforts aiming towards poverty reduction. PRSPs are regarded as a 
means to improve the coordination of development assistance between governments and devel-
opment partners. A PRSP sets out a country’s macro-economic, structural, and social policies 
programme to promote growth and reduce poverty. Usually, the countries draw up a PRSP 
every three to five years in a participatory process including a broad range of stakeholders. Core 
principles include a description of the participatory process, a comprehensive poverty diagnos-
tics, priorities for macroeconomic, structural and social policies as well as targets, indicators and 
systems for monitoring and evaluating progress (World Bank 2011). As such, PRSPs are not 
simply statements of government policy, but also include contributions from national civil soci-
ety actors (Black/Sward 2009: 5).  
Since migration represents a significant livelihood strategy for poor people, this factor is also 
recognized in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in Senegal and Mali. A recent review 
of PSRPs (Black/Sward 2009) reveals that they tend to focus on the idea that migration is a 
result of lack of development, and that African PSRPs concentrate on the need for rural devel-
opment projects to prevent internal rural-urban migration flows. However, according to that 
study, the treatment of international migration, internal migration and immigration is differing. 
For example, the PRSP of Mali (2008) mentions positive elements of international migration in 
terms of impact on development and poverty reduction; and Senegal (IMF 2007) notes the posi-
tive effect on household incomes (Black/Sward 2009: 13f.). The PRSP of Senegal (IMF 2007) 
also refers to potential benefits of internal migration in terms of development and poverty reduc-
tion, insofar as it contributes to better access to employment or better paid work for poor people 
(ibid.: 18f.). The Malian PRSP (IMF 2008) proposes rural development initiatives as a way of 
addressing internal migration by better integrating young people into social life, and by devel-
oping ‘job-seeking aptitudes’ (ibid.: 26). The 2007 Senegal PRSP also outlines a range of ways 
in which emigration is significant for the country, and it sets out a series of concrete policy 
                                                       
17   The formation of ECOWAS in 1975 expanded migration opportunities for West Africans. Since 1978, ECOWAS 
has established conventions allowing free movement of people and goods between member states. The freedom 
of mobility is enshrined in the ECOWAS protocol of 29 May 1979 on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of 
Residence and Establishment. However, the implementation of the protocol remains difficult, as past expulsions 
testify. As has been noted, police and border officials have taken bribes as forms of unofficial toll (Bakewell/de 
Haas 2007: 104).   
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measures to increase an exchange with the Senegalese Diaspora. The study reveals that the fo-
cus of PRSPs in sub-Saharan Africa is mostly lying on undertaking rural development projects 
aimed at curtailing rural-urban migration. Despite necessary improvements in rural infrastruc-
ture, the authors take a critical look at this approach, “as it ignores the importance of internal 
migration as a livelihood strategy for the poor, as well as the fact that increased mobility may be 
a natural product of rural development measures” (Black/Sward 2009: 34). Similarly, other au-
thors such as de Haas (2007) point out the fact that development projects aimed at stopping the 
rural exodus often fail, or even have the opposite effect: “Poverty reduction is not in itself a 
migration-reducing strategy (…); alleviating absolute poverty and achieving some degree of 
‘development’ in the form of increasing income, education and access to information not only 
enable but also motivate more people to go abroad. As long as aspirations increase faster than 
the livelihood opportunities in sending regions and countries, social and economic development 
will tend to coincide with sustained or increased out-migration” (de Haas 2007: 833).  
 
5.3  “Co-Development” 
In recent years, the European Union has increasingly attempted to link migration and develop-
ment policies by integrating migration respective migration control issues into its relations with 
third countries (de Haas 2007: 827) The European Union launched several initiatives regarding 
the regulation of migration from West Africa. In 2002, the EU proposed to link EU develop-
ment aid to the willingness of governments to readmit irregular migrants originating from their 
own and third countries.  
Mali and Senegal have been chosen by France for ‘co-development’ in order to link migration 
and development policies. In December 2000, a Mali-France Consultation on Migration was 
established as a bilateral discussion at ministerial level to enhance closer cooperation between 
the migrants’ country of origin and country of destination . Under the terms of this agreement, 
representatives of the two countries meet annually to deal with issues relating to the integration 
of Malians who want to remain in France, with co-management of migration flows to allow 
migrants to circulate between their home countries and abroad, and with cooperative develop-
ment in core emigration localities in Mali. The programme aims to aid in core emigration re-
gions, seeks to build infrastructure and stimulates job creation. Furthermore, it supports educa-
tion, health care, infrastructure development and income generation. Malians abroad shall be 
mobilised  for  their  country’s  economic  development  through  small  enterprises.  “The  pro-
gramme has also helped some migrants to return voluntarily and become self-supporting – the 
cost of repatriation is being used to encourage voluntary return in a more humane manner while 
also providing livelihood for returnees, who are mostly unskilled workers” (Adepojou 2008: 40).  
However, some authors criticize French co-development programmes as “de facto ‘return and 
stay-at-home policies” (de Haas 2007: 827). It is argued that recent EU policies seem to employ 
a narrow focus on the ‘return potential’ as development factor. Stimulating development is re-
garded as the key to help the migrants stay at home. “The suspicion remains that curbing immi-
gration is a more important goal than contributing to development” (ibid.: 829).  
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5.4  Migration Policies in Senegal 
Until recently, Senegal had no formal migration policy and has been relatively liberal regarding 
the entry and residence of foreigners. During the last decades migration issues were not consid-
ered as being very significant and political action was mainly limited to international agree-
ments. Immigration is traditionally considered as positive and is linked to free mobility within 
the African continent and to the socio-cultural values of hospitality (Gerdes 2007: 3, Di Bar-
tolomeo et al. 2010: 8). Today, several ministries are in charge of migration management
18 
which creates confusion concerning who’s in charge of what and results in a lack of coordina-
tion in migration governance (Some 2009, Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010: 8).  
International migration is a major concern of the Senegalese government, which has multiplied 
its efforts for cooperation, mainly with the EU and several European countries and seeks to em-
bed migration management into a development strategy. The country has promoted the govern-
ance of legal and illegal migration flows as part of a concerted strategy together with European 
countries (particularly France, Spain and Italy). The Senegalese government has signed bilateral 
agreements with third parties which deal with all aspects of migration: regular or legal migra-
tion; irregular or illegal immigration; and development or co-development migration (Some 
2009). It signed agreements with France (2006/2008), Italy (2008) and Spain (2006) concerning 
increasing possibilities for legal migration to Europe. In response to the large number of mi-
grants attempting to reach the Canary Islands in recent years, the Senegalese government has 
entered into talks with various European countries and the EU. In October 2006, Senegal and 
France signed an agreement as a basis for for the faster deportation of irregular migrants. On the 
other hand, this agreement made it easier for professionals, students and artists to enter France 
legally. Other agreements were signed with Spain in the same year. Thereby, the expulsion of 
irregular migrants was facilitated, but an increase in development aid was agreed on as well. 
Furthermore, the European Commission has been financing a project of more than one million 
Euro to help Senegalese authorities to support control of irregular migration. Border security 
was also strengthened as a result of the international pressure following the increasing number 
of migrants attempting to reach the Canary Islands since 2006 and the national outrage over the 
high numbers of deaths caused by these perilous crossings. The coast is guarded relatively 
closely by the state, and since 2006 the European border security “Frontex” patrols Senegalese 
and Mauritarian waters to prevent potential migrants from the crossing (Gerdes 2007: 4).  
Given the increasing remittances of migrants and their significance for the national economy, 
the topic of migration has become more relevant in the political discourse. The most significant 
domestic policy efforts in the area of emigration have been devoted to the use of emigrant po-
tential for development. To this end, the Ministry of Senegalese Abroad (Ministère des Sénégal-
ais de l’Extérieur) was established. Political efforts focused on convincing Senegalese abroad to 
                                                       
18   Responsible for Immigration: (1) Higher Council of Senegalese Abroad; (2) Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Bureau 
d’Accueil, d’Orientation et de Suivi des Actions de Réinsertion des Émigrés (BAOS); (3) Ministry of the Interior; 
(4) Ministry of the Youth and of Employment for the Young; (5) Ministry of the Senegalese Abroad; (6) Ministry 
of Labour and Public Service; (7) National Commission for Managing and Following Up on Employment Offers. 
Responsible for Emigration: (1) Ministry of Interior, (2) Ministry of Labour and Public Service, (3) General Di-
rectorate of National Security, (4) Directorate of Air and Border Police.  
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make productive investments in the country. On the basis of a bilateral agreement, France fi-
nanced for the first time in 1983 a programme of vocational training for imigrants abroad who 
wanted to return. In 1987, France and Senegal established the Bureau of Reception, Orientation 
and Follow-up of Actions for the Reinsertion of Emigrants (Bureau d’Acceuil, d’Orientation et 
de Suivi des Actions de Réinsertion des Émigrés, BAOS), which is now under the auspices of 
the foreign office. “The BAOS attends above all to smaller projects concerning returning emi-
grants, but is little-used due to administrative deficiencies, insufficient funding, and migrant’s 
lack of confidence in the organisation” (Gerdes 2007: 4).  
As Wabgou (2008: 149) emphasizes, bilateral agreements usually do not sufficiently represent 
the interests of the Senegalese government. Therefore, the Senegalese government should “take 
its own initiatives instead of waiting for proposals from France, because propositions such as 
these  are  often  approved  through  some  kind  of  ‘negatioation’,  performed  within  a  context 
strongly characterised and influenced by the unequal bargaining power between the relational 
partners”. In contrast, Gerdes (2007: 4) emphasizes the active role of the Senegalese govern-
ment, which supported an increase for legal opportunities for migration to Europe. “In negotia-
tions with European states, it has emphasised the necessity of supporting development projects 
rather than turning to repression to reduce migration. It has, moreover, voiced support for im-
proved protection for migrants in Africa and Europe”.  
In 2008, the EU invited Senegal to open negotiations for a Mobility Partnership, a partnership 
that addresses labour migration opportunities and irregular migration (Some 2009: 67). How-
ever, the negotiations with Senegal have stalled. Moreover, Senegal signed a convention on co-
development  for  the  reintegration  of  Senegalese  citizens  for  voluntary  repatriation  (ANSD 
2004: 208). The government of President Wade accepts the repatriation of illegal migrants and 
is heavily criticised for this policy internally (Grimm 2009: 31). Furthermore, Senegal is one of 
five Maghreb-Sahel-states (Morocco, Mauretania, Mali, and Tunisia) declared as transit state on 
the Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development, in 2006 in Rabat. As transit state 
Senegal is obligated due to a UN declaration to prevent migrants to cross the country to immi-
grate irregularly into another county (Marfaing/Nadi 2009: 28).  
Senegal signed the ECOWAS protocol about free circulation of individuals and goods, rights of 
residence and establishment in 1979 (ANSD 2004: 208, Wabgou 2008: 147). However, of all of 
the clauses contained in the protocol, only visa-free entry for citizens of the Community has 
been implemented to date (Gerdes 2007: 3). The permeability of frontiers, among others due the 
importance of value of hospitality, as well as incoherent control mechanisms adds to the com-
plexities of irregular and transit immigration on Senegalese territory (Di Bartolomeo et al. 2010: 
8, Wabgou 2008: 147). At the end of the century a new dynamic of collaboration between 
Senegal and its neighbours emerged as consequence of the Senegalese emigration and its impact 
on national affairs: Declarations of Bamako (1999), Dakar (2000) and the conclusions of the 
Symposium about the new partnership with the Senegalese abroad (2001) (ANSD 2004: 208).  
The national politics regarding migration are coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
involve several other Ministries as well as Development Aid Institutions. National policies in-
clude four main areas of action: (1) formation of professionals, (2) fighting document falsifica- 
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tion, (3) intensifying border controls and (4) monthly reports on development, practices and 
details of the legal, political, administrative and operational framework on migration in Senegal 
(Some 2009: 69).  
On a national level the government supports civil society and developing institution in general. 
Projects and programmes implemented shall create awareness among young people on the risks 
of  clandestine  migration, promote  employment  opportunities  for  young  people  and  women, 
tighten regulations against passengers, and encourage, welcome and integrate voluntary repatri-
ates in society (Some 2009: 67). 
Since unemployment among young people is a strong driving force for (e)migration, the gov-
ernment launched various initiatives for governmental assistance which include job service for 
young people on job search and assistance of enterprises, subsidies on salaries, public work, 
credits for small enterprises and self-employment (ANSD 2009: 57).
19  
Migration issues are also incorporated in development plans, like the Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Paper (see chap. 5.3). Strategies related to migration are: job promotion by involving emi-
grants in the development of communities; improved labour management; the establishment of 
an effective system for managing and monitoring the Senegalese population living abroad; the 
strengthening of programmes for the social and economic integration of youths; promotion of 
the rehabilitation and reintegration of repatriates and displaced persons; and improved refugee 
management strategies (Some 2009).
20  
The Senegalese government encourages, for example, the immigrants’ return into agriculture: 
The Plan de Retour Ver l’Agriculture (Plan REVA), was implemented in November 2006, as a 
response to decreasing income from agriculture and the consequential increasing rural exodus. 
Consequences are an increase in depopulation of rural areas, concentration of active population 
in urban areas with only low employment opportunities and a massive clandestine emigration. In 
sum, Plan REVA aims to counter irregular emigration and rural exodus by creating sustainable 
conditions for people to return to rural areas and to agriculture (MAS 2010, Some 2009: 70).
21  
                                                       
19   These are some of the projects by the Senegalese Government to create and promote employment for young 
people to reduce to will to emigration: (1) the National Action Fund for Employment (FNAE); (2) the National 
Fund for Youth Promotion (FNPJ) www.fnpj.sn; (3) the Agency for the Execution of Works of Public Interest 
(AGETIP); (4) the Project for the Promotion of Rural Micro-businesses (PROMER); and (5) the Labour Service 
within the Directorate of Employment (Some 2009). Further projects are (6) the National Agency for Youth Em-
ployment (ANEJ) www.jeunesse.gouv.sn/IMG/pdf/ANEJ.pdf; (7) the Office for the Employment of the Youth 
from the Suburbs (OFEJBAN) – www.ofejban.sn (PEJU/GTZ); (8) Fonds National d’Aide à l’Emploi (FNAE); 
(9) Le Service civique national (SCN) – www.jeunesse.gouv.sn/IMG/pdf/scn-2.pdf (ANSD 2009: 57); (10) In-
formation System for an Efficient Governance of Migrations (SIGEM) and (11) the Funds for supporting invest-
ments by the Senegalese Abroad (FAISE). 
20   Programmes  with  international  partners  are:  (1)  Migration  for  Development  in  Africa  programme  (MIDA–
Senegal), (IOM); (2) Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN)-project (UNDP); (3) Co-
development Initiative (by the Senegalese President’s Office) (Some 2009) and (4) Valuation of Forest Ecosys-
tems in Senegal (IOM). 
21   Plan REVA aims to stimulate economic growth by supporting agriculture and developing an agro-industry. In 
addition, the programme promotes the improvement of food security and the increasing contribution of agricul-
ture to the GDP with a high proportion on export (MAS 2010, Some 2009: 70). The Plan REVA is part of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Millennium Development Goals, the “Loi d’orientation agro-sylvopastorale  
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In Senegal, the “Transfer on Knowledge Trough Expatried Nationals” (TOKTEN) programme 
was created in 2002. The first phase ran until 2006 and was managed by the UNDP, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the African Union for Senegalese Abroad. It was seeking to encourage 
Senegalese expatriate professionals to come back to their country for a short period of time (1–6 
months) to take up teaching assignments in local institutions or to contribute to the development 
of sectors in crisis such as health, food industry, medicine, etc. A new TOKTEN programme has 
started in 2011 and will run until 2015, managed by the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The programme has two main missions: firstly, the mobilization of the Senegalese Diaspora in 
order to support administrations; local collectivities, private sector, civil society and development 
projects; secondly, the creation of partnerships between organizations in the North and organiza-
tions in the host countries via the experts of the Diaspora (TOKTEN 2011).  
 
5.5  Migration Policies in Mali  
Mali modified its legal framework for the entry and stay of foreign nationals in its territory in 
2004 and 2005. In doing so it abolished the French decree of 1932 and the French ordinance of 
1945, which used to govern foreign national’s admission and residence in some colonial territo-
ries of French Western Africa, and also abolished the law of 1966 concerning expulsion .  
As an active member of ECOWAS, Mali accepts freedom of circulation, residence and estab-
lishment for member-state nationals among the 15 member countries (Findley 2004). “Mali 
undeniably inclines towards facilitating circulation, especially for its own nationals who, be-
sides the freedom to circulate within the ECOWAS space, hold one of the most privileged Sub-
Saharan nationalities in terms of ease of entry into Maghreb countries” (Di Bartolomeo et al. 
2010: 4). Mali has also bilateral agreements allowing Malian migrants to circle between Mali 
and its neighbours Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Guinea. Additionally, Malian citizens 
are exempted from a visa requirement for entrance to several countries such as Algeria, Mo-
rocco and Tunisia. However, the absence of visa requirements for holders of a Malian passport 
is also an important factor with regard to trafficking (ibid.). ECOWAS nationals are exempted 
from visa requirements for Mali.  
The country has not adopted the principle of emigration penalization and resists pressures which 
might increase its commitment to migration control and readmission. According to Di Bar-
tolomeo et al. (2010: 4) Mali remains opposed to the French idea of “chosen immigration” 
which is not judged being suitable for its emigration interests. In contrast to Senegal, it has so 
far refused to sign an agreement with France on the joint management of migration flows, 
which would ease repatriation of irregular migrants. In 2007 Mali signed a cooperation agree-
ment with Spain concerning immigration, leading to a progressive acceptance of circulation 
control and offering a framework for the return of a large number of Malian emigrants.  
                                                       
(LOASP) and the Strategy of promotion of growth (Stratégie de croissance accélérée (SCA); www.sca.sn) (Some 
2009: 70).   
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According to regional standards, Mali has a relatively open citizenship law. The right of blood 
has been extended to women since 1995. It gives women the right to transmit their nationality to 
their children. Furthermore, dual citizenship is allowed (ibid.).  
During the democratization in 1991, the relations of Malians living abroad with the Malian gov-
ernment achieved a new level. This new relationship was made possible by the political recogni-
tion of the migrant’s benefits by their country of origin due to the constitution of the Higher 
Council of Malians abroad (Haut Conseil des Maliens de l’Exterieur). In 2000, the General 
Delegation of Malians abroad (Délégation Générale des Maliens de l’Exeterieur) was created. 
This body is in charge of protecting the interests of expatriate Malians, fostering their participa-
tion in the country’s development and following-up return aid actions. Furthermore, Malians 
living abroad are represented in the High Council of the authorities and in the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Council. They also have a parliamentary representation (Di Bartolomeo 2010: 6). 
In 2004 the Ministry for Malians abroad and African Integration (Ministère des Maliens de 
l’Exterieur et de l’Intégration Africaine, MMEIA) was formed. The MMEIA is in charge of the 
repatriation of migrants and is thus at the cutting edgebetween national interests, on the one 
hand, and the claim to represent the concerns of the migrants, on the other. With these institu-
tions the Malian government seeks to integrate the political forces abroad, as well as the eco-
nomic potential of international migration into the national development strategies (Sieveking/ 
Fauser 2009: 88).  
Given the situation that Malians represented the largest group of Africans trying to enter Europe 
illegally, the EU promised additional aid to the country in September 2007 with the objective to 
stimulate social development and diminish international migration flows. According to an EU 
statement, an additional 426 million Euro will be made available between 2008 and 2013 (van 
Vliet/van  Beek  2007:  126).  In  2008,  the  Migration  Information  and  Management  Centre 
(CIGEM, Centre de’Informations et de Gestion des Migrations) was founded in Bamako on the 
initiative of the European Union (EU). The aim of the centre is to contribute to the definition 
and implementation of a Malian migration policy in response to the concerns of potential mi-
grants, returning migrants and migrants residing abroad and which is adapted to national, re-
gional and international dynamics. The Centre seeks to inform and guide potential migrants by 
providing information about legal migration possibilities and restrictions for Europe, by creating 
awareness for possible risks of illegal migration and by informing about work opportunities 
abroad. It also aims to support voluntary and involuntary returnees. Further objectives are the 
encouragement of activities in the realm of development policies and investments on the part of 
the Malian Diaspora, as well as research on migration in Mali and the neighbouring region. 
Main partners of the Centre are Mali, the EU, France and Spain. The start-up of the CIGEM has 
been financed by the European Commission as a pilot project designed to enhance Mali’s capac-
ity to deal with migration issues in cooperation with neighbouring countries and with Europe.
22 
CIGEM is part of a comprehensive approach towards migration emerging from the high-level 
meetings in Rabat (July 2006), and Tripoli (November 2006) and from the political dialogue 
between Mali and the EU under Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement. The result of these meet-
                                                       
22  CIGEM recieved 10 million Euro in funding from the 9th European Development Fund (EDF).   
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ings  was  a  Joint  Declaration  on  “Migration  and  Development”,  signed  by  France,  Spain, 
ECOWAS, the European Commission and Mali in February 2007 with CIGEM as the opera-
tional outcome of that Declaration. However, aside from the official agenda of CIGEM, its im-
plementation and the impacts on migration remain unclear. On the one hand, there is little ac-
cordance on migration policies and coordination among the main participating partners Mali, 
EU, France and Spain. On the other hand, legal work and study opportunities in Europe are 
complicated and are administered restrictively. Against this background, there is much scepti-
cism concerning CIGEM and an opinion frequently expressed in the Malian public is that the 
Centre essentially serves to avert migration directed to Europe (Sieveking/Fauser 2009: 100).  
In 1998, the “Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatried Nationals” (TOKTEN) programme 
was created in Mali. It is managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the Malian government.
23 Initially, it only covered higher education which had a great need 
for improvement at the opening of the University of Mali in 1996. Today, the TOKTEN pro-
gramme scope is extended to the health sector, agricultural sector and small and medium com-
panies. It encourages Malian expatriate professionals to come back to their country for a short 
period of time (1–6 months) and to take up teaching assignments in local institutions or to con-
tribute to the development of sectors in crisis such as health and agriculture. It receives financial 
aid from the CIGEM, the UNDP and the European Commission (CARIM 2011).  
 
 
                                                       
23   The TOKTEN programme was initiated by the UNDP and funds the services of expatriate national experts for 
well prepared short term assignments with selected host institutions in the government, academic and research in-
stitutions, private sector and non governmental organizations.   
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6  Conceptual Approach of micle  
Diana Hummel, Martin Doevenspeck, Cyrus Samimi,  
Clemens Romankiewicz, Victoria van der Land, Martin Brandt 
 
The general hypothesis of the micle project states that migration takes place under specific so-
cial-ecological conditions.  Different  actions  and  strategies taken  by  individuals,  groups  and 
societies to cope with changes of their natural environment depend on “societal relations to na-
ture” that are rooted in history and culture (Becker et al. 2011, Görg 1999). Phenomena are not 
defined on the basis of single ecological or social factors, but rather by complex feedback links 
between the ‘natural’ and the ‘societal’ realms. As such, climate and environmental changes 
produce specific processes that cannot be assigned to one or the other exclusive categories ‘na-
ture’ or ‘society’. Changes of ecosystems such as land degradation are not only a result of bio-
physical dynamics but also of human actions and decisions. These actions and decisions are 
influenced by social, cultural, political and economic settings, and environmental changes in 
turn influence these settings. Causes and motives for migration (and for the decision not to mi-
grate) overlap, and thus cannot be strictly separated as the popular idea of “push and pull fac-
tors” asserts. 
As has been illustrated in chapter 2, trying to understand the linkages between climate, envi-
ronmental changes and migration implies severe conceptual and methodological challenges. In 
order to analyse the social-ecological conditions of migration, the micle project follows a multi-
method and multi-level research design. We integrate three different approaches into the topic 
that cover a range of qualitative and quantitative research methods: Firstly, by the way in which 
migration is presented the project seeks to conceptually and methodologically separate local 
assessments of climate and environment in order to avoid a suggestive causality between cli-
mate, environment and migration in the research design. Secondly, issues of vulnerability, live-
lihood strategies and agency are analysed in order to better understand the role of migration as 
adaption mechanism to cope with (environmental and other) changes i.e. migration as part of 
leading one’s life. Thirdly, changes of the natural environment will be identified in time series 
data for climate and environmental parameters. As most of these data relate to a global scale, 
they have to be downscaled to a regional and local level; and the connections between climatic 
changes and environmental changes must be analysed.  
 
Mobility and Local Dimensions of Climate and Environment 
Research results are shaped by the way questions are formulated. In questionnaire approaches, 
for example, interviewees are often subjected to intensive ‘problem scanning’ with respect to 
their migration motives, their economic situation and environmental changes. Establishing a 
direct link between environmental factors and migration during fieldwork is highly problematic, 
since the researcher hints at causal connections rather than the respondent (see Mertz et al. 
2009: 810). Taking for granted a causal link between environmental changes and migration in 
the research design and directly asking about such links leads to a perpetuation and reification  
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of general narratives on climate, the environment and migration issues (Romankiewicz/Doeven-
speck 2011). 
Within the multi-method and multi-sited research design of micle and based on the theoretical 
synthesis described in chapter 2, in our ethnographic analysis we develop a methodology that 
avoids asking respondents explicit questions about the links between environment, climate and 
migration,  let  alone  asking  directly  if  climatic  and  environmental  changes  cause  migration. 
Moreover, we deal separately with local assessments of climate and vegetation trends (West et al. 
2008) on the one hand, and migration on the other, by carrying out the respective fieldwork at 
different times. This, we think, gives respondents the opportunity to elaborate both on the subtle 
and complex social, economic and political undercurrents that relate to migration and on their 
own conceptualisations of environment and climate beyond a migration framework (Roman-
kiewicz/Doevenspeck 2011). 
Fieldwork takes the form of multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995: 106), meaning that migra-
tion networks originating from the study areas are followed (“follow the people”) to do semi-
structured individual and group interviews and biographical interviews at the migrants’ home 
villages,  during  migration  and  at  different  migration  stations.  “Migration  processes  actually 
induce cultural change, not only with regard to the identity of migrants themselves, but also 
with regard to those who have remained home” (Klute/Hahn 2007: 16). If we consider that peo-
ple’s identities are influenced by migration processes, then their views on and interpretations of 
migration in general, and on climate and vegetation in particular, may also be subject to con-
stant change, and depend amongst other things on the individual migration experience as well as 
the current migration station. Consequently, people who have never migrated from the study 
regions must also be included in the research. Moreover, the multi-site approach is motivated by 
rejecting the sedentary bias inherent in migration research (see Verne/Doevenspeck, forthcom-
ing). Conceptualising movement “as constitutive for economic, social and political relations” 
(Urry 2007: 43), the so-called mobility paradigm acknowledges mobility as an integral part of 
human life and not as a problem per se, regardless of the place where this life is lived. We there-
fore refer to “mobile ethnography” (Sheller/Urry 2006), embracing a set of mobile methods to 
focus on the process of movement and different migration stations, since “all places are tied into 
at least thin networks of connections that stretch beyond each such place and mean that nowhere 
can be an ‘island’ ” (ibid.: 209). 
Regarding the environment, we are not evaluating the effects of climate trends in the study areas 
as outcomes of global climate change. Instead, we argue in favour of the relevance of various 
trends in climate variability and the importance of its different cultural, social and political di-
mensions, by focusing on local people’s representations, perceptions and interpretations of cli-
mate, environment and changes therein. Here, we use the same methods and address the devel-
opment of temperature, rainfall and wind, soil fertility, woody cover, the diversity of tree popu-
lation, capacities of pasture, and crop yields (see Mertz et al. 2010, Roncoli 2006). Village eld-
ers can give valuable information with respect to longer time periods, and transect walks with 
individual villagers and farmers around the settlements reveal people’s assessment of changes in 
vegetation, availability and exploitation of woody resources, and soil fertility (see Gonzalez 
2001).  
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Vulnerability, Livelihoods and Agency  
Until few years ago, the dominant perspective in scientific discussion regarded migration as 
failure to adapt, that migration is “the worst scenario and the option to avoid, and that policies 
should strive to enable people to stay” (Piguet et al. 2011: 15). Today, migration, both internally 
and internationally, is frequently regarded as an adaptation strategy of households and individu-
als: “mobility, along with income diversification, is an important strategy to reduce vulnerabil-
ity to environmental and non-environmental risks, including economic shocks and social mar-
ginalization. In many cases, mobility not only increases resilience but also enables individuals 
and households to accumulate assets” (Tacoli 2009: 104, see also Scheffran et al. 2011). How-
ever, as scholars of the migration & development theory argue, the propensity to migrate typi-
cally does not merely rest upon individual cost-benefit calculations, but also depends on peo-
ple’s aspirations (de Haas 2008). From this perspective, migration can be regarded as “a normal 
part of social transformation processes and a way in which people can exercise agency to im-
prove their livelihoods” (Castles 2009). Several scholars emphasize the different levels of vul-
nerability and argue that the most vulnerable often lack the capability to move and are thus not 
able to use migration as a livelihood strategy (Adger 2006: 268, Leighton 2011, Piguet et al. 
2011). It must be studied in detail, what this means for our research regions. Furthermore, mi-
gration represents not only a livelihood strategy of underprivileged people, but is also character-
istic of the better off. Thus, migration must not necessarily constitute only a coping strategy, but 
may also constitute a way of life (Black 2006: 2, Kliot 2004: 83). Particularly for the Western 
African contexts, migration has been understood and investigated as an adaptation strategy. So 
the question arises: adaptation to what? We hypothesize that migration must be regarded within 
a continuum of structure and agency: it depends on structural conditions (i.e. economic, politi-
cal, social, environmental conditions), but also on individual capabilities and aspirations (van 
der Land 2011). Against this background we investigate under which conditions and to which 
extent migration constitutes a household strategy to secure and improve livelihoods or an indi-
vidual concept of life. Based on a triangulation methodology, research methods applied consist 
of participatory observation, semi-structured and in-depth interviews. Furthermore, a survey 
will be conducted in regions of origin and destination of migrants (Linguère and Dakar/Senegal 
& Bandiagara and Bamako/Mali) including items to migration patterns, attitudes, perceptions of 
environmental changes, land use and food security.  
 
Climate Variability and Environmental Change 
Environmental change and climate variability in the study regions Bandiagara/Mali and Lin-
guère/Senegal are surveyed, analysed and evaluated on a local and regional scale. A special 
focus will be on land degradation. The work will be mainly based on time series of satellite data 
of variable spatial and temporal scale, and on extensive field work. Beside continuous satellite 
data, time series images with higher resolution will be used. The time before the dry period in 
the 70s and 80s is depicted by high resolution CORONA images recorded in the 60s. Since the 
80s, satellite data with a resolution of at least 30 m have been available. These data will be 
evaluated against the background of the data from our own fieldwork, adjusted to the study re-
gion and extended by our own surveys. The work includes spatial and temporal analyses of ex- 
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isting climate data and remote sensing data. Climate data and data on vegetation change, both 
derived from satellite products (e.g. TRMM, GIMMS, SPOT VGT) are used to decouple vege-
tation trends from climate trends using statistical methods. Based on these results, areas with 
decoupled trends will be assessed in the study regions. Beside natural scientific methods to ana-
lyse processes of biotic and abiotic interactions, the experience and knowledge of the local 
population will be incorporated. An important aspect will be to relate our results on environ-
mental change in the study region to the perception and evaluation of local people (“Socializing 
the Pixel“, Geoghegan et al. 1998). This represents an important input into the ground truthing 
process while enabling us to better understand how various environmental changes are linked to 
land use and how changes influence the livelihoods of the local population. 
 
Synthesis and Integration 
An integrated analysis of the social-ecological conditions of migration must deal with various 
challenges:  It  must  cross  the  disciplinary  divide  and  connect  natural-scientific  and  social-
scientific methods and data. Different temporal and spatial scales need to be reflected (e.g., mi-
gration types and destinations, local rainfall and vegetation patterns within a certain period). 
Furthermore, we need to consider different levels of analysis – the micro level (preferences and 
decision making, needs satisfaction, income generation etc.), the meso level including land use 
patterns, provisioning structures and policies etc., and the macro level of overall structural con-
ditions such as ownership and production patterns, economic and political power relations, and 
gender arrangements.  
Given these challenges, the different research questions and approaches of the micle project de-
scribed above will be integrated in an iterative proceeding, using several integration instruments 
such as common formulation of hypothesis, theoretical work and modelling. A conceptual frame-
work is needed that allows formulating robust statements about the social-ecological conditions 
of migration. Here, we can draw on different initiatives that connect knowledge across diverse 
disciplines, explicitly oriented towards a comprehensive, system-based approach that conceptual-
izes human-nature interactions as social-ecological systems (SES) (Folke 2006, Ostrom 2009, 
Liu et al. 2007, Glaser et al. 2012). Most recently, some scholars in the research field of climate, 
environment and migration refer to the SES concept (Renaud et al. 2011: 11, Oliver-Smith 2009: 
14). Indeed, the SES perspective seems to provide a productive framework for the analysis of 
interactions amongst (climate-induced) environmental changes and migration. However, the SES 
approach has not been systematically applied to the climate-environment-migration nexus so far. 
Based on the conceptual and empirical research, the micle project will contribute to the specifica-
tion of the SES perspective for the climate-environment-migration nexus.  
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